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INTRODUCTION

Over the past 200 years, United States judges have developed a
series of rules and practices that minimize the role of international
law in domestic litigation. Considered collectively, these rules and
practices embody a thoroughgoing, deeply rooted provincialism-an
institutional, almost reflexive, animosity toward the application of international law in U.S. courts. As a consequence, international law
plays almost no part in the judicial business of the United States. It is
rarely discussed in American cases, and almost never provides the rule
of decision upon which court judgments turn.
The provincialism of U.S. courts is in many ways puzzling. First, it
is hard to square with official doctrine. The Constitution, for example, makes treaties the supreme law of the land,' and the Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted that "international law is part of our
law." 2 Second, it is hard to reconcile with the role ofjudges, who are
institutionally committed to the rule of law. Because international law
is law (a position debatable in some quarters but not in the courthouse),3 judges might be expected to lead the fight to apply it.4 Instead, they appear to have led the retreat. Third, the provincialism of
U.S. courts seems, on its face, bizarrely at odds with contemporary
conditions. It is a cliche, but no less true for that reason, that Ameri1

2

U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), quoted in First Nat'l City Bank v.

Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 452-53 (1964); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73
(1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
3 Judges seldom question the legal character of international law, but philosophers
sometimes take a different view. See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text (discussing
positivism and international law). Without doubting its legal character, diplomats and
political scientists often doubt international law's usefulness or practical relevance. See,
e.g, DEAN ACIHESON, FRAGMENTS OF My FLEECE 156 (1971); GEORGE F.

1

ENNAN, AMERICAN

DwLomAcy 1900-1950, at 95-101 (1951); HANs J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS
279-314 (5th ed., rev. 1978); Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of InternationalLawyers, 2 INT'L
LAw. 591, 592 (1968); Ian Brownlie, The Reality and Efficacy of InternationalLaw, 52 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981).

4 See, e.g., Edward D. Re, JudicialEnforcement of InternationalHuman Rights, 27 AKRON
L. REv. 281, 300 (1994) (urging that effective enforcement of universally accepted legal
norms ought to be the concern of both lawyers and judges).
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can judges and lawyers are increasingly confronted with cases involving persons, property, or events outside the United States!5-just the
sorts of cases in which international law might be relevant. At the
same time, the scope and detail of international law has expanded
dramatically, 6 making it ever more likely that international law does in
fact have something to say about the situations lawyers and judges increasingly confront.
In the face of its puzzling development and growing anachronism
how can the provincialism of U.S. courts be understood or defended?
The answer is important, and not just for courts. Judicial provincialism inevitably migrates from the bench to the bar, and ultimately to
the citizens and residents of the United States. Sensible litigators simply do not waste their time making arguments that are unlikely to persuade. Given the provincialism of U.S. courts, it is never surprising to
find international law argued at the back of a brief, if it is argued at
all. 7 Because our courts apply international rules so infrequently,
those rules become largely irrelevant in document drafting and transactional planning as well.
Puzzling in its development and profound in its implications, judicial provincialism warrants the kind of systematic study that it seldom receives. 8 During law school and later practice, one is likely to
5 See, e.g., S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and Its Impact on Domestic Institutwons, 1 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 99 (Fall 1993); Harold H. Koh, TransnationalPublic
Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ. 2347. 2365-66 (1991);Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the
Age of InternationalLegisprudence, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 185, 188 (1993); Recommendation & Report, 1993 A.BA SEC. INT'L L. & PRAc. 2-3.
6 See, e.g., BENEDETrO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
LEGAL SYSTEMS 3-5 (Rene Provost trans., 1993); Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW at
xxviii-xxix (3d ed. 1993); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 39-43 (2d ed. 1986);
ABRAM CHAYES ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS at ix-x (1968).
7 See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESIsrANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 1415 (1987) ("Invariably it is the case that the international law arguments are at the very
bottom of the list of grounds upon which [criminal defense attorneys] intend to defend
their clients. In order of priority, attorneys usually strongly prefer any type of argument
based on the United States Constitution ... ; then traditional substantive and procedural
criminal law defenses; and finally, principles of international law.").
8 Several scholars have examined the individual doctrines that tend to marginalize
international law. See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 325 (1986); MichaelJ. Glennon, ForeignAffairs and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine 83
AM. J. INT'L L 814 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760
(1988). Less frequently, scholars have taken a broader perspective, examining clusters of
such doctrines. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POuTICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICML ANSWERS:
DoEs THE RULE OF LAw APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAiRs? (1992) [hereinafter FRANCK, POLITICAL

QUESTIONS] (examining the political question doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and foreign sovereign immunity); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAw AS LAw OF THE UNITED

STATES (forthcoming 1996) (examining series of issues concerning international law's
treatment in all three branches of government). Still other scholars have examined the
role of particular kinds of international law in U.S. courts, or the receptivity of U.S. courts
to particular classes of international cases. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE LJ. 2277 (1991) (arguing that certain types of
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meet some rules and doctrines that help to minimize the role of international law in U.S. courts: standing requirements, the political question doctrine, the rule that treaties may not be invoked in U.S. courts
unless they are self-executing, and perhaps others.9 But these rules
and doctrines tend to be examined individually, and not always with
particular reference to their effect on international law. They are typically scattered among several different courses in the legal curriculum-constitutional law, conflicts of law, civil procedure, and public
international law, among others-and are thus studied in scattered
ways by both students and scholars. For practicing lawyers, the rules
and doctrines ofjudicial provincialism arise haphazardly-whenever a
situation or lawsuit makes them relevant. Random confrontations and
compartmentalized treatment hide the larger picture, a picture from
which we can learn a great deal.
This Article begins by painting the larger picture. Part I collects
all the rules and practices that conspire to minimize the role of international law in U.S. courts. The very size of the collection suggests the
depth and breadth ofjudicial animosity toward international law and
helps to dispel the impression, created by the Constitution and by
some Supreme Court opinions, that international law plays a serious,
effective role in domestic judicial practice. In addition, Part I groups
the relevant rules and practices by type. It identifies three different
ways in which U.S. courts marginalize international law: (1) by refusing to hear international cases; (2) by refusing to apply international
rules in the cases they do hear; and (3) by treating both international
cases and international law as if they were domestic.
Part II examines four Supreme Court cases decided within the
past four years. The cases illustrate the deeply provincial character of
American judging, and reveal, in a concrete way, how provincialism
manifests itself in judicial decisions. Part III reviews the consequences
of provincialism-its harms to litigants, our courts, and the United
States as a whole-and suggests why those consequences cannot be
ignored. Part IV seeks to explain why provincialism survives despite its
international cases are and ought to be heard in U.S. courts); Jordan J. Paust, Customary
InternationalLaw: Its Nature, Sources and Status asLaw of the United States, 12 MIcH.J. INT'L L.
59 (1990) (surveyingjudicial references to and uses of customary international law in U.S.
courts); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist Vew of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 665 (1986) [hereinafter Trimble, Revisionist View] (arguing that customary international law appropriately plays a more modest role than do treaties in domestic judicial

practice).
The purpose of this Article, however, is to survey all of the rules and practices that
tend to marginalize international law, whatever the source of that law (treaties, custom, or
other sources) and whatever its substantive content. Such a project necessarily sacrifices
the subtlety of narrower studies, but illuminates connections and recurring themes that
narrower studies cannot.
9 See infra part I for the effect these and other rules have on international cases.
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harms. The different forms of provincialism are founded on different
sets of supporting grounds, ranging from constitutional concerns to
ignorance. None, Part IV argues, is strong enough to justify U.S.
courts' current maltreatment of international law.
Reform is needed. Because judge-made law forms the primary
basis for provincialism, judges are in the best position to do some° The Article therefore concludes, in Part V, by
thing about it.I
urging
the adoption of judicial education programs in international law.
Judges will likely desire change once they see the issues and understand the stakes involved.
I
THE THREE FACES OF PROVINCIALISM

Despite their number and disparate origins, the elements ofjudicial provincialism fall into three main patterns or types: those that
keep international cases from being heard at all; those that prevent
international law from providing the rule of decision in cases that are
heard; and those that hinder the proper handling of international issues and materials.
A. Jurisdictional Provincialism
'Jurisdictional provincialism" refers to the judiciary's use of rules
that marginalize international law by providing grounds upon which a
court may decline to hear a case with international ramifications.
These doctrines address questions of 'jurisdiction" or 'justiciability,"
that is, the propriety of a court deciding a case at all. Doctrines of this
type include:
(1) personal jurisdiction requirements;"
10 See Edward D. Re et al., JudicialEducation on InternationalLaw Committee of the Section
of InternationalLaw of the American Bar Association: FinalReport, 24 INr'L LAW. 903, 903-04
(1990) (noting that international legal issues presented to courts are often not identified
or considered adequately; calling for efforts to enhance the capacity of courts to recognize
and address such issues). There are, of course, limits to judge-made reform. Other organs
of the U.S. government equal or surpass the judiciary in their bias against international
law, and the work of those organs constrains the options available to courts. To take the
most obvious example, the U.S. Senate is often reluctant to give its advice and consent to
the ratification of treaties the United States has previously signed, and U.S. courts cannot
apply unratified treaties, regardless of their commitment to international law.
11 See FED. R. CIv. P. 4 (covering federal service of process and personal jurisdiction
requirements); 4A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1133-1136 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing complexities and difficulties of
obtaining service of process over foreign litigants in federal courts). See generally Gary B.
Born & Andrew N. Vollmer, The Effect of the Revised FederalRules of CivilProcedureon Personal
Jurisdiction, Service, and Discovery in International Cases, 150 F.R.D. 221 (1993) (discussing
1993 amendments); Gary B. Born, Reflections onJuridicalJurisdictionin InternationalCases, 17
GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 1 (1987).
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
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subject-matter jurisdiction requirements;' 2
3
foreign sovereign immunity;'
14
standing requirements;
15
the political question doctrine;
16
forum non conveniens doctrine;
lis alibi pendens doctrine; 17 and
8
the act of state doctrine.'

12 Federal courts obtain jurisdiction over many international cases pursuant to the
"alienage" provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2) (1988) (establishing federal jurisdiction
over controversies between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state").
Jurisdiction in these cases is defeated if foreign nationals appear on both sides of the dispute. See cases cited infra note 20.
13
With important exceptions, foreign states and certain related entities are immune
from suit in U.S. courts. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
'1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1988). Before the passage of that Act, judicial decisions
often provided immunity. See, e.g., National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348
U.S. 356, 358 (1955) ("Very early in our history this immunity was recognized and it has
since become part of the fabric of our law.") (citations omitted); The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) ("One of these [restrictions on the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory] is admitted to be the exemption of the person
of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory.").
14
Because international law is primarily thought to concern relations between states,
non-state parties to litigation may not be able to invoke that law in their claims for relief.
See IAN BROWNLIE,PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-60 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing primacy of states as subjects of international law); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D.
BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 64 (6th ed. 1976) (arguing that under classic
conception of international law, an individual's ability to benefit from international rules
depends on his or her link with a state, which is alone competent to assert rights against
other states); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 7071 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("Although individuals... have some independent status as
persons in international law, the principal relationships between individuals and international law still run through the state, and their place in international life depends largely
on their status as nationals of states.").
15 See FRANCE, POLrIcAL QUESnONs, supra note 8, at 10-20; Louis HEtuKrN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 208-16 (1972) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS];
Jonathan I. Charney, JudicialDeference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 807-08
(1989); Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and Allocation ofForeign
Affairs Power, 13 HorsTRA L. REv. 215, 230-31 (1985); Glennon, supra note 8, at 814-16;
Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion"Doctrine?,85 YALE LJ.597 (1976).
16 See, e.g., Sheila L Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, ForeignPlaintiffsand Forum Non
Conveniens, 16 BROOK J. INT'L L. 241 (1990); Gordon W. Paulsen & Robert S. Burrick,
Forum Non Conveniens in Admiralty, 13J. MAR.L. & COM. 343 (1982).
17 See GARY B. BoRN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CiviL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 320-21 (2d ed. 1994).
18 See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-53 (4th ed. 1981) ("International law is said to require each state to
respect the validity of the public acts of other states, in the sense that its courts will not pass
judgment on the legality or the constitutionality of the acts of a foreign sovereign under his
own laws."); REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (1986) ("The act of state
doctrine precludes the Court from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power within its own territory.... The essence of the act of state
doctrine is that the act of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned
by the courts of another.").
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Courts have used all of these doctrines to decline hearing cases
with international content. International cases often involve foreign
defendants who are considered beyond the personal jurisdiction of
our courts because of their location outside the United States or general lack of contact with the United States. 19 Even if all the parties are
subject to personal jurisdiction, federal courts, especially, may find
themselves lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, frequently because foreign nationals appear on both sides of the dispute.2 0 Jurisdiction is
also blocked, with certain exceptions, when the defendant is a foreign
2
state or a related entity. '
Assuming jurisdiction is established, a court may nonetheless refuse to hear an international case because the plaintiff lacks standing
to assert a claim based on international law,22 the claim raises a political question more appropriately addressed by the executive or legislative branches, 23 the forum is determined to be inconvenient, 24 similar
19 E.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984);
Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1257 (1st Cir. 1990); Guardian Royal

Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Giannouleas v. Phoenix Mar. Agencies, 525 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (La. Ct. App.), rev', 525 So. 2d
1043 (La. 1988).
20 E.g., Lloyds Bank PLC v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Arai v.
Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (D. Haw. 1991); Hercules Inc. v. Dynamic Export
Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
21 E.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1473 (1993); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, 12 F.3d 317, 330-31 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1644
(1994); Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 999 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denieA 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
22 E.g., United States v. Sainsbury-Suarez, 797 F.2d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 1986) (ruling
that crew of foreign vessel detained by U.S. officials for suspected drug smuggling lacked
standing to complain of international law violation); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254
(5th Cir. 1984) (ruling that individuals lacked standing to raise claims under United Nations Charter); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[I]ndividuals lack standing to assert violations of [non-self-executing] international treaties in the absence of a protest from the offended government."). See also SEC v. Briggs,
234 F. Supp. 618, 620-21 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (doubting whether U.S. citizen had standing to
object to process served on her in Canada on the ground that the service violated Canadian sovereignty).
23 E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992) (suggesting that
question of U.S. violations of "general international law principles" is a matter for the
executive branch); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (stating
that questions of foreign policy belong to executive branch); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963
F.2d 332, 337 (11th Cir. 1992) (determining civil action against Nicaraguan anti-government organizations and leaders presented nonjusticiable political question); Greenham
Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating
that action by non-Congressional litigants raised nonjusticiable political questions), aft'd,
755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 903 (D.D.C. 1982) (deciding that action by members of Congress against President and Secretaries of Defense
and State nonjusticiable), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1251
(1984); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (D. Mass. 1968) (determining that
defendant's argument that United States involvement in Vietnam violated international
law involves a nonjusticiable political question).
24 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1981); Ahmed v. Boeing Co.,
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litigation is proceeding elsewhere, 25 or a decision would require the
court to judge the legality of another nation's acts taken within that
26
nation's borders.
Not all of these rules and doctrines were created specifically for
the purpose of reducing the international workload of domestic
courts.2 7 Nor were all of them created by courts.28 Indeed, a few of

the doctrines, like foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state
doctrine, are animated by a deference to other nations and the requirements, real or perceived, of international law. But whatever
their initial purposes and sources, and whatever their congruence
with international law, these rules and practices, taken together, repeatedly screen out the sorts of cases that international law is most
likely to govern.
B.

Doctrinal Provincialism

"Doctrinal provincialism" refers to thejudiciary's use of rules that
restrict when international law can provide the rule of decision in a
court's judgment. If not for its long-windedness, this might better be
called "rule-of-decision provincialism." International law traditionally
arises from three major sources: treaties, custom, and general principles of law.2 9 Several rules and practices of U.S. courts limit the use of
such sources in domestic litigation. These rules and practices include:
(1) the rule that prevents litigants from invoking treaties unless
they are "self-executing";30
720 F.2d 224, 225-26 (1st Cir. 1983); Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l,
SA., 712 F.2d 11, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 866-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aftd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
E.g., Saemann v. Everest & Jennings, Int'l, 343 F. Supp. 457, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
25
Robinson v. Royal Bank of Can., 462 So. 2d 101, 101-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Gillis v.
Gillis, 391 So. 2d 772, 772-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bentil v. Bentil, 456 N.Y.S.2d 25, 2526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410-37 (1964); Oetjen v.
26
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) ("To permit the validity of the acts of one
sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would
very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations.'").
27
Many leading cases involving personal jurisdiction, the political question doctrine,
standing, and the forum non conveniens doctrine, for example, arose in a purely domestic
context. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (personal
jurisdiction); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (standing); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 503 (1947) (forum non conveniens); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 139 (1803) (political question doctrine).
28
The Constitution and federal statutes, for example, impose federal subject-matter
jurisdiction requirements. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
29
RE TATEMENT, supranote 14, § 102(1); Statute of the International Court ofJustice,
June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
30 See, e.g., Whimeyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster & Elam v. Neilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert.
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(2) the rule that congressional legislation supersedes pre-existing
treaty provisions;3 1
(3) the reluctance of U.S. courts to recognize the existence of
international custom;

32

(4) the rule that courts may not invoke customary law, unless, like
33
treaties, it is self-executing;
(5) the rule that congressional legislation supersedes pre-existing
34
customary law;
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); see also

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 14,

§ 111(3);

JOSEPH

G.

STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 85 (10th ed. 1989) ("[T]reaties which are

not self-executing, but require legislation, are not binding upon American courts until the
necessary legislation is enacted."); WALLACE, supra note 18, at 43 ("Self-executing treaties
are automatically part of American domestic law-i.e., no complementary legislation is
required-whereas non self-executing treaties are not incorporated into domestic law until
the necessary enabling legislation has been passed.").
31 See, e.g., Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316 (1914):
Treaties are contracts between nations, and by the Constitution are made
the law of the land. But the Constitution does not declare that the law so
established shall never be altered or repealed by Congress. Good faith toward the other contracting nation might require Congress to refrain from
making any change, but if it does act, its enactment becomes the controlling law in this country.
(quoting lower court); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115(1) (a) (specifying conditions under which congressional acts will supersede prior treaties); 2 CHARLES C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 59 (1922)
(arguing that an act of Congress is regarded as superseding a prior treaty); GARY L. MAReS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 224 (1984) ("In the United States, the rule established by court decisions since the 1880s for which has precedence between a law of Congress and a treaty, is
that the latest is given effect."); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States,
82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1563 n.31 (1984) ("Both the equality of statutes and treaties and the
later-in-time rule have, however, been upheld in numerous cases and seem firmly
established.").
32
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The requirement
that a rule [of customary international law] command the 'general assent of civilized nations' to become binding upon them.., is a stringent one."); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 53 (2d ed. 1993) ("If no treaty can be found to
authoritatively regulate a matter, it is by no means certain that customary international law
will ... provide a... rule to fill the gap."); Trimble, Revisionist View, supranote 8, at 684
("American courts have rarely applied customary international law, and have almost never
applied it as a direct restraint against a government or a governmental interest").
33 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
"rights under international common law must belong to sovereign nations, not to individuals" and that international common law "obviously could not be 'self-executing' in the
sense that a treaty might be."). See also Trimble, Revisionist View, supra note 8, at 693
("[c]ustomary law, like treaties, may be non-self-executing, creating law between states but
not in favor of individuals unless Congress has enacted implementing legislation."). But see
Paust, supra note 8, at 87 (stating that customary international law has been directly incorporable in U.S. law without any need for a special statutory base); Henkin, supra note 31, at
1561 (arguing international law is self-executing, and is applied by courts without need for
congressional action).
34 See, e.g., Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that an "inconsistent statute simply modifies or supersedes customary international law to the extent of the inconsistency" and that "under domestic law, statutes supersede customary international law."); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664,
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(6) the rule that executive action supersedes pre-existing customary law;3 5 and
(7) the reluctance of U.S. courts to recognize the existence of an
international rule based on the "general principles of law recognized
36
by civilized nations."
International law cannot provide the rule of decision in a given
case unless an international rule is found to exist, and U.S. courts are
noticeably stingy in this regard. In American practice, only treaties
are reliable generators of international rules; custom and general
principles of law are virtually ignored in the law-finding process. 37
Moreover, if a court determines that a rule from the international system exists, it often denies its application, either because the rule is not
"self-executing," or, if it is self-executing, because congressional or
presidential action has overridden it. The end result is that U.S.
courts seldom decide international cases on the basis of international
law.
666 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("lIt has long been settled in the United States that the federal
courts are bound to recognize [treaties, statutes, and the Constitution] ...as superior to
canons of international law."), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp 1161, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[I]nternational [customary] law must give way when it conflicts with or is superseded by a federal statute or treaty
... ."); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115(1) (a) (specifying when congressional
acts supersede existing custom); 1 INTERNATIoNAL LAW." BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 170 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970) ("[B]oth customary and conventional international law are placed in the same position as any other part of municipal law,
they may be overridden by an Act of Congress .... ."); STARKE, supra note 30, at 84-85 ("[A]
later clear statute will prevail over earlier customary international law.").
35
See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 889 (1986) (giving effect to actions of the Attorney General despite court's acknowledgement that those actions violated customary law); United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp.
1291, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (acknowledging that a controlling act of the executive branch
may supersede customary international law); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115
reporters' note 3 (discussing authority for the position that the President may violate customary law); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict
Between Statutes and Customary InternationalLaw, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 143, 145 (1984) (arguing
that the U.S. government has the power, via a "controlling executive act," to disregard
customary international law). Scholars differ on the ability of the executive branch to
trump customary international law. CompareJordanJ. Paust The Presidentis Bound by InternationalLaw, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 377 (1987) (arguing that President may not lawfully violate
binding international law) with Henkin, supra note 31, at 1567-69 (arguing that President
has the power, if not the authority, to violate international law, and courts will not invalidate such acts because of such violation).
36 No U.S. court, so far as this author can determine, has squarely found a "general
principle of law" to exist. See VON GLAHN, supra note 18, at 25 ("[M]any international
lawyers as well as statesmen harbor serious doubts as to the validity of the claim that 'general principles' represent a usable source of international law."). But cf.Howard S. Schrader, Note, Custom and General Pfinciples as Sources of InternationalLaw in American Federal
Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 751, 770-79 (1982) (describing uses of "general principles" in
U.S. decisions).
37 See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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Methodological Provincialism

"Methodological provincialism" refers to the judicial tendency to
handle international cases as if they were domestic cases. U.S. courts
tend to use domestic patterns of analysis in identifying the relevant
issues in a case and in addressing and defending the resolution of
those issues. This type of provincialism, unlike jurisdictional and doctrinal provincialism, does not depend on a specific set of legal rules or
doctrines, but instead flows from an approach to rules and their analysis-an approach demonstrably different from that of international
courts and tribunals.
This form of provincialism usually springs from the tacit assumption that international law works on the same principles, and with the
same dynamics, as American law. It causes U.S. courts to:
(1) ignore or undervalue custom and general principles of law
(primary sources of law in the international system, but largely unknown to our domestic one);38
(2) undervalue scholarship (which, although a secondary source
in both systems, has traditionally enjoyed a higher status in the international system) ;39
(3) overvalue judicial decisions (a primary source of law domestically, but a secondary one internationally);4o
(4) interpret treaties as if they were domestic statutes or contracts; 41 and
38 See ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1) (b)-(c) (directing the International Court
of Justice to apply custom and general principles of law); RESTATEMENT, supra note 14,
§ 102(1) (a), (c) (explaining that international law is composed, inter alia, of custom and
general principles).
39
RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 103(2) (c) (when determining whether a rule has
become international law, substantial weight is accorded to the writings of scholars);
BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 24-25 ("[T]he opinions of publicists are used widely" under
the Statute of the International Court); HENrN ET AL., supra note 6, at 123 ("The place of
the writer in international law has always been more important than in municipal legal
systems."). See ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1) (d)(teachings of the most highly qualified publicists provide a subsidiary means for determining rules of law).
40
The Statute of the International Court ofJustice expressly describes judicial decisions as a "subsidiary means" for determining the content of international law, nominally
on par with the work of scholars and below treaty, custom, and general principles. ICJ
Statute, supra note 29, art. 38 (1) (d). Even decisions of the ICJ itself bind only the parties,
and only with respect to the particular case decided. Id., art. 59. Although the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States reports that "substantial
weight" is accorded judicial decisions, it accords the same weight to scholarly writings. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 103(2) (a)-(b).
41
For recent examples of this practice, see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 662-63 (1992), and Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563-67 (1993),
both discussed more fully infta, Part II. See also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40
(1931);Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439
(1921); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1,
36-37 (1896); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1880); Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct.
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(5) support propositions of international law with domestic
42
citations.
Because methodological provincialism displays itself in judicial
method and attitude, rather than in the express invocation of particular doctrines or rules, it is harder to detect than provincialism's other
forms. Nevertheless, it exists, even at the highest levels of the national
judiciary. The United States Supreme Court, in four recent cases, provides some of the clearest, sustained examples of the phenomenon.
II
PROVINCIALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT

During the last four years, the United States Supreme Court has
considered a handful of cases with obvious international ramifications. Four of those cases, each to be studied here, involved respectively: (1) a U.S. government-sponsored kidnapping in Mexico; 43 (2)
a U.S. company's alleged discrimination against an American citizen
working in Saudi Arabia;4 4 (3) a U.S. antitrust action against British
nationals for conduct that occurred in Great Britain; 45 and (4) the
U.S. government's interception of Haitian nationals on the high
seas. 46 Each case involved other nations' interests. Additionally, there
existed in each case a body of international law that directly addressed
those interests. Yet the Supreme Court almost wilfully minimized the
effect of international law. Not once did international law provide the
rule of decision. Not once did it provide the framework of analysis.
And only occasionally, in 100 pages of written opinions by four successive majorities, was it even mentioned by name. In the recent practice
of the Supreme Court, international law has dropped from sight with
hardly a trace. 47
115, 125-26 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. O'Connor v. United
States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).
42
For a recent example of this practice, see Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662-63 (supporting law of treaty interpretation and law of international extradition with domestic
citations).
43
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
44 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991).
45
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2898 (1993).
46
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2552 (1993).
47
SeeHarryA. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104YALELJ. 39, 40
(complaining that in recent cases, including Alvarez-Machain and Sale, the Supreme Court
"has shown something less that 'a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.'"). The
prognosis for international law is not, however, entirely bleak. Each of the four cases mentioned above generated dissents and international law received fair treatment in at least
two of those opinions. SeeHartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2917-22 (ScaliaJ., dissenting in part); Sale,
113 S. Ct. at 2567-77 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). In addition, lower federal courts, as well as
state courts, are occasionally more sympathetic to international law than is our highest
tribunal. See, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd
sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); United States VerdugoUrquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 505 U.S. 1201
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The international kidnapping case, United States v. AlvarezMachain,48 is particularly instructive, and forms the principal object of
study in this Part. The other three cases will be examined more
briefly, to demonstrate that the provincialism of Alvarez-Machain is not
idiosyncratic and to highlight additional features of provincialism not
fully apparent in Alvarez-Machain. Taken together, these cases not
only reveal the deeply provincial character of Supreme Court decision-making, but also illustrate how the different forms of provincialism actually manifest themselves in the work of U.S. courts.
A. The Curious Case of Alvarez-Machain (and Why It Is So
Curious)
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that a Mexican national's forcible abduction from Mexico, at the request of U.S. government officials, did not rob U.S. courts of jurisdiction to try him on
federal criminal charges. 4 9 As one might expect, the decision generated a maelstrom of law review comment-most of it critical. 50 National leaders from around the world were critical as well:
Neighboring countries like Canada and most Latin American states,
long-time friends including Switzerland and Australia, and more
predictable critics, such as Cuba and Iran, [reacted negatively]. The
Chinese press, eager to discuss a human rights issue other than the
Tienanmen Massacre, joined the chorus. 51
(1992); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), afl'd sub nom.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 504 U.S. 655
(1992); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (international
human rights); Van Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D.D.C. 1985) (international
law regarding treatment of diplomats), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); State v.
Miller, 755 P.2d 434, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction).
48
504 U.S. 655 (1992).
Id at 657.
50 Compare Manuel R. Angulo &James D. Reardon, Jr., The Apparent Political and AdministrativeExpediency Exception Established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Humberto
Alvarez-Machan to the Rule of Law as Reflected by Recognized Principlesof InternationalLaw, 16
B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 245, 245 (1993) andJonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here?
ForeignAbduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REv. 939, 943-44 (1993) and Michael J.
Glennon, State-SponsoredAbduction: A Comment on U.S. v. Alvarez-Machan, 86 AM.J. INT'L L.
746, 746 (1992) and John Quigley, Our Men in Guadalajaraand the Abduction of Suspects
Abroad: A Comment on U.S. v. Alvarez-Machan, 68 NoRE DAME L. REv. 723, 723-24 (1993)
and HernanJ. Ruiz-Bravo, MonstrousDecision:KidnappingIsLegal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
833, 834-35 (1993) (criticizing the decision) with Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the
Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736. 737 (1992) (defending
the decision).
51 Bush, supra note 50, at 942 (internal citations omitted); see generally David 0. Stewart, The Priceof Vengeance 78 A.BA J. 50 (Nov. 1992) (describing the adverse reactions of
several nations).
49
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The Mexican government, of course, considered the decision "invalid
52
and unacceptable."
From the perspective of the international lawyer, however, the
most striking aspect of the case does not lie in the Supreme Court's
ultimate decision. The precise substantive issue decided by the Court
was narrow. The Court held that a state-sponsored abduction of another state's national from its territory will not, in the absence of an
explicit treaty obligation to the contrary, rob the abducting state's
courts ofjurisdiction to try the abductee-an issue important enough
53
for only a sentence or two in a general treatise on international law
and a decision at least plausibly correct. 54 Of much more enduring
interest is the Court's approach to the case: its conception of the issues presented and its methods of resolving them. This approach was
doggedly domestic, and confirms the meager role of international law
in U.S. courts.
It is hard to imagine a case more squarely international in both its
facts and ramifications. Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was
accused of participating in the kidnap, torture, and murder of a U.S.
official in Mexico. A U.S. grand jury indicted him. Mexican nationals, at the urging of U.S. officials, kidnapped him in Mexico and
brought him to the United States. He was prosecuted in U.S. courts.
The Mexican government repeatedly protested the kidnapping and
prosecution. 55 Upon such facts one could organize a three-day conference on international law, with panels on international human
rights, territorial sovereignty, extradition, national jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce domestic legislation, diplomatic protection by a
state of its own nationals, and the international drug war.
How remarkable, then, to read the opinion of Alvarez-Machain:
its structure, its argument, and its supporting sources are thoroughly,
almost fanatically, domestic. The Court framed its entire opinion by
asking whether the reasoning of one previous Supreme Court case
(Ker v. lllinois56 ) rather than another (United States v. Rausche757 ) controlled the case at bar.58 As a matter of form, international law was
not engaged at all. Nor was it engaged as a matter of substance, except in the secondary and attenuated sense that Ker and Rauscherdis52 Tim Golden, After Court Ruling Mexico Tells U.S. DrugAgents to Halt Activity, N.Y.
Twis, June 16, 1992, at A19.

See, e.g., BROWNIE, supra note 14, at 317.
See infranote 68 (citing a representative sample of materials on the substantive law
of international abductions and national jurisdiction).
55
United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. 655, 656 (1992).
56 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
57 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
58
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 658-64.
53

54
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cuss international law.59 The Court took Kerfor the proposition that
the abduction of a defendant does not rob a U.S. court ofjurisdiction
to try that defendant. It took Rauscherfor the proposition that jurisdiction may not exist if the treatment of a defendant violates an extra60
dition treaty.
Because the choice between Ker and Rauscher depended on
whether the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty had been violated, the
Court understandably sought guidance on how to construe treaties.
International lawyers would reflexively turn to Articles Thirty-one and
Thirty-two of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna Convention"), 6 ' but the Court, just as reflexively, turned elsewhere. "In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute," the Court
59 The RauscherCourt carefully examined international law. Justice Miller, writing for
the majority, examined the terms and history of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842
between England and the United States, the practice of nations regarding extradition treaties, and the writings of international publicists. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 410-34. The Ker
Court, however, allowed international law to play only a minimal role in its analysis, largely
because the relevant extradition treaty "was not called into operation...." Ker, 119 U.S. at
443.
60 Alvarez-Machai, 504 U.S. at 658-64.
61

ARcLE 31

General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as
an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
ARTicLE 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according
to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), opened for
signatureMay 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, arts. 31, 32 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention, the document is largely a restatement of existing law and the U.S. Department
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said, "we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. '62 Everything about this passage is domestic: its implied equation of domestic
statutes and international agreements; its command to look first to
the terms of the treaty (a simpler methodology than that which the
Vienna Convention describes);63 and its supporting reference to two
previous Supreme Court decisions instead of to international legal
sources. Whether or not this approach caused the Court to err in its
interpretation of the treaty, one is struck by its failure even to acknowledge that the interpretation of treaties might be a matter of international law.
The Court's citation practice further reveals its surprisingly domestic perspective. International legal decisions typically include references to treaties, historical accounts of state practice, court
decisions from several nations, and the works of publicists-all traditional sources of international law. 64 The opinion in Alvarez-Machain,
however, refers almost exclusively to previous Supreme Court decisions, even for propositions that, for the international lawyer, are most
naturally supported in other ways. 65 The Court made no references to
courts outside the United States, to the work of international organizations, or to scholarship produced outside the United States.
Finally, the Alvarez Court simply by-passed any serious discussion
of customary international law. This is puzzling, not only because custom, along with treaty law, forms a primary source of international
law, 66 but because custom has something to say about state-sponsored
abductions. 6 7 Since there are serious disputes about the content of
of State has reported that the Vienna Convention "is recognized as the authoritative guide
to current treaty law and practice." S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
62 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 663 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)
and Valentine v. United Stats ex. reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (1936)).
63 The Convention's rules of interpretation are considerably more complex than the
rule the Court offered. According to the Convention, the first level of analysis involves not
only the words of the treaty (including preamble and annexes), but also contemporaneous
side agreements and the treaty's "object and purpose." Vienna Convention, supranote 61,
arts. 31(l)-(2), 32.
64 Traditional sources, generally speaking, are treaties, customary law, general principles of law, scholarship, and judicial decisions. See ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1).
65 The first example of this practice was the Court's citation to its own cases for the
law of treaty interpretation. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Another example appears a bit later. "In the absence of an extradition treaty, nations are under no
obligation to surrender those in their country to foreign authorities for prosecution." Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 664 (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12
(1886), and Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933)).
66
ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1)(b); Restatement, supra note 14, § 102(1)(a).
67 E.g., Restatement, supra note 14, § 432 cmt. c ("If the unauthorized action includes
abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return
of the person, and international law requires that he be returned."); Restatement, supra
note 14, § 432 reporters' notes 2, 3; F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecutionof Persons Abducted in Breach of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 407
(Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

that customary law,68 one might have expected the Court to discuss

the matter at some length. Instead, the Court addressed custom in
two sentences:
Respondent and his amid may be correct that respondent's abduction was "shocking," . . . and that it may be in violation of general
international law principles. Mexico has protested the abduction of
respondent through diplomatic notes, . ..

and the decision of

whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter
69
outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch.
In this remarkable passage, the Court displayed all three forms of
judicial provincialism. First, the Court suggested that a customary violation, if shown, is properly the business of the executive branch. This
bears the mark ofjurisdictional provincialism: by sending the matter
to the executive branch, the Court left international law unvindicated
in the judicial branch. Second, the Court acknowledged, but took no
position on, the question of whether international custom has in fact
been violated. This bears the mark of doctrinal provincialism: by failing to take a position on customary international law, the court rendered it impossible for that custom to provide the rule of decision.
Third, the very brevity of the passage, along with the Court's studied
sloppiness in nomenclature ("general international law principles"
must surely refer to custom), bear the mark of methodological provincialism. Because international custom has no simple analogue in
American law, the Court virtually ignored its importance.
The Court's approach in Alvarez-Machain lies in stark contrast to
70
the work of foreign courts facing similar issues. The courts of Israel,
South Africa, 7 1 and the United Kingdom,

72

for example, found it im-

portant to review the international law regarding state-sponsored ab68 At least one national court has held that the international illegality of a state-sponsored abduction from another state robs the abducting state's courts ofjurisdiction to try
the abductee. State v. Ebrahim, 31 I.L.M. 888, 899 (S. Afr. 1992). Indeed, scholars who
have examined the issue of state-sponsored abductions have almost universally condemned
them. See e.g., Abraham Abramovsky & Steven J. Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged
Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction or IrregularRendition, 57 OR. L. REv. 51, 92 (1978);
FA Mann, supra note 67, at 420 (stating that such abductions are "bound to lead to international anarchy and friction .... ."). Nevertheless, several scholars maintain that the illegality of an abduction does not rob the abducting state ofjurisdiction to try the abductee.
E.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 317; Malvina Halberstam, Agora: InternationalKidnapping,
86 AM.J. INTr'L L. 736, 737-38 (1992).

69

Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669 (citations omitted).
Attorney-General of the Govt. ofIsr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 57-76 (Dist. ct.Jerusalem 1961) (upholdingjurisdiction over abductee), affd, 36 I.L.R. 277, 342 (Sup. Ct. Isr.
1962).
71 Ebrahim, 31 I.L.M. at 899 (decliningjurisdiction over abductee).
72 R. v. Plymouth Magistrates' Ct., exparte Driver, 2 All E.R. 681, 695-97 (Q.B. 1985);
R. v. Bow St. Mags., ex parte Mackeson, 75 Crim. App. 24 (CA 1981).
70
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ductions or at least to examine the practice of other states. 73 Rare is
the case, like Alvarez-Machain, in which a national court addressing
these issues has cited only its own precedents. 74
The reasoning of Alvarez-Machain is bound to strike the international lawyer as bordering on the perverse: How can one discuss the
proper interpretation of a treaty and not cite the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties? How can one ask whether an act violates
treaty law and, given a negative answer, not reflexively go on to ask
whether the act violates custom? How can one write an opinion involving international legal issues without a single reference to sources
outside the United States?
The strangeness of the Court's approach is demonstrated by
those who have risen to defend the opinion. In one of the earliest
such defenses, for example, Professor John M. Rogers began by observing that:
There is a very respectable argument that permitting [AlvarezMachain's trial in the United States] is perfectly consistent with
United States obligations under customary international law, and
that no treaty has changed the customary rule. The argument is
supported by policy, as well as by international precedent.75
He went on to argue that no rule of customary international law mandates the return of an abducted national to his home state, and that
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, because it failed to address abductions, did not change that result as between those two states. 76 In
short, Professor Rogers made the international arguments that the
Court could have made but did not. Likewise, in the October 1992
issue of the American Journal of InternationalLaw, Professor Malvina
Halberstam ably argued, inter alia, that the "Court's holding [in Alvarez-Machain] is consistent with existing international law."'7 7 In support of that proposition she cited examples of state practice, decisions
78
from courts in several different countries, and the work of publicists.
She, too, was concerned with showing that the Supreme Court could
have found support for its holding if it had consulted international
law. As students of international law, both Rogers and Halberstam felt
73 See also ReArgoud, 45 I.L.R. 90, 103 (Cass. crim. 1964) (including notation by reporter that French judges were willing to examine precedents from other nations);
Afouneh v. Attorney-General, 10 Ann. Dig. 327, 328 (Palestine Sup. Ct. 1942) (citing
MooRE's DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1906)).

74 Such cases do, however, exist. E.g., R. v. O./C. Depot Battalion, 1 All E.R. 373
(K.B. 1949). But even here, the English court discussed Scottish precedent. Id. at.377-78.
75 John M. Rogers, Response to President's Notes on Alvarez-Machain, ASIL NEwsL. (Am.
Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 5.
76

Id

77

Halberstam, supra note 50, at 737.
Id. at 737-39.
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compelled to defend the Court on grounds the Court itself either ignored or left undeveloped.
Alvarez-Machain is indeed a curious case. Redolent with international implications, it was nonetheless treated by the Supreme Court
as a domestic case, to be decided on the basis of domestic law and
precedent. This is certainly not the approach one would have expected from an international tribunal, nor, it appears, from the courts
of other nations. It is, however, an approach one might have expected from an American court, and from the Supreme Court in particular, for the Supreme Court repeats the provincialism of AlvarezMachain in several other recent cases.
B.

Alvarez-Machain in Context: Aramco, Hartford,and Sale
1. Aramco

The issue in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.7 9 ("Aramcd') was
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196480 governed a U.S.
company's employment of a U.S. citizen in Saudi Arabia. The Court
held that it did not: Congress is presumed to intend legislation to
apply only within the territory of the United States, and only a clear
expression of contrary intent can overcome that presumption.8 ' The
petitioners' evidence that Congress intended an extraterritorial reach
for Title VII was insufficiently clear for the Court to overturn the terri82
torial presumption.
The Court treated this case as if it raised a matter of purely domestic law-the proper interpretation of a congressional act.
Throughout its entire opinion, the Court cited only U.S. statutes and
cases. But it could have handled Aramco differently. International law
has generated a body of principles regarding the proper reach of national legislation-principles that bear on the ability of a nation to
prescribe conduct beyond its borders.8 3 The Court, therefore, could
have asked whether these principles permitted (or precluded) the extraterritorial application of Title VII for which the petitioners argued.
In the alternative, the Court could have used these international rules
as an interpretive aid, asking how they might legitimately affect the
construction of a congressional statute. The Court chose neither of
79

499 U.S. 244 (1991).

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
82
Id at 248-58. Congress itself promptly overturned the Court's interpretation of
Tide VII, amending the law to explicitly cover the employment of U.S. nationals abroad.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988 & Supp. In 1991).
80
81

83

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, §§ 402, 403.
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these paths and, indeed, failed even to acknowledge the existence of
84
applicable international rules.
The Court concededly adopted its territorial presumption partly
out of deference to the interests of other nations and with a view to
avoiding the conflicts that might arise if U.S. laws were applied extraterritorially.8 5 Accordingly, one might be tempted to understand the
Court as tacitly acknowledging the limits imposed by international
law. But this is not how the Court understood the matter. The Court
itself called the territorial presumption "a longstanding principle of
American law" and cited domestic precedent for support.8 6 Moreover,
had the Court really looked to international law for guidance, it likely
would have fashioned a different rule. The international law of prescriptive jurisdiction does not restrict nations to prescribing conduct
solely within their physical borders,8 7 but instead recognizes the ability
of states to prescribe extraterritorial conduct if that conduct has certain other connections with the prescribing state.88 These non-territorial grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction have grown so important in
recent years that contemporary international law does not readily support the Court's heavy territorial presumption.8 9
84 The Court's apparent ignorance of the international law of prescriptivejurisdiction
led it to say some odd things in its analysis:
If petitioners are correct that [Title VII] applies to employers overseas, we
see no way of distinguishing in its application between United States employers and foreign employers. Thus, a French employer of a United States
citizen in France would be subject to Title VII-a result at which even petitioners balk. The EEOC assures us that in its view the term "employer"
means only "American employer," but there is no such distinction in this
statute and no indication that the EEOC in the normal course of its administration had produced a reasoned basis for such a distinction.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255. International law, which allows states broader regulatory powers
over their nationals, as compared to non-nationals, abroad, provides the "reasoned basis
for such a distinction." See RESTATEMENT, supranote 14, § 402.
85 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
86 Id.at 248 (emphasis added) (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).
87 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, §§ 402, 403.
88
Subject to certain restrictions, for example, a state may regulate the conduct of its
nationals wherever they are found, and the conduct of non-nationals abroad if that conduct has direct and substantial effects on the prescribing state. RESTATEMENT, supra note
14, §§ 402(1) (c), 402(2) (describing as justified both the regulation of conduct outside a
state's territory that has, or is intended to have, substantial effect within its territory, and
the regulation of activities of a state's nationals outside as well as within its territory).
89 At the beginning of this century, one could more plausibly characterize international law as limiting a state's prescriptive jurisdiction to its own territory. Today, however,
international law evidences a great deal more flexibility in assessing claims of prescriptive
jurisdiction. See, e.g., RESTATEiENT, supra note 14, §§ 402-404 (describing the bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction and the limitations on that jurisdiction, respectively); Gary B.
Born, A Reappraisal of the ExtraterritorialReach of U. S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1
(1992); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: ExtraterritorialApplicationof Amefican Law, 1991 S.Or.

REv. 179, 183-84.
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In sum, the Aramco Court treated the issue before it as raising
matters of purely domestic law despite both the obvious international
implications and the existence of a relevant body of international law.
In this sense, the Aramco decision represents an even more thoroughgoing example of provincialism than Alvarez-Machain, which at least
made a few passing references to international law.9 0
2.

Hartford

The Supreme Court faced a similar issue in HartfordFireIns. Co. v.
California.91 In this consolidated case, nineteen states and several individuals sued a number of domestic and foreign insurance companies
alleging a conspiracy that made certain kinds of insurance coverage
unavailable to American insurance buyers.9 2 The case raised several
issues under U.S. antitrust law, but only one issue had international
ramifications.
In the relevant part of the case, several British defendants sought
to dismiss the claims against them on the ground that Section One of
the Sherman Act did not apply to their conduct outside the United
States. 93 The Court treated the defense as raising issues of purely domestic law-the proper interpretation of a congressional act and the
propriety of domestic judicial abstention.
The Court first turned to the interpretation of the Congressional
act. "[I] t is well established by now," said the Court, "that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and
94
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."
The principle, once stated, was easy to apply, since the plaintiffs had
alleged that the British defendants conspired to affect and did affect
the United States. 95 The defendants next argued that the claims
against them should be dismissed on grounds of international comity.96 This defense failed as well, with the Court remarking that comity
could be invoked only if there was a "true conflict between domestic
and foreign law."97 Here, it observed, there was no "true conflict" because British law did not requireBritish insurers to act in the ways complained of in the antitrust suit.98
90 E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666-68 (1992) (mentioning
international law briefly).
91 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
92 Id. at 2895.
93 Id. at 2908-09.
94 Id. at 2909.
95

Id.

Id. at 2909-11.
97 Id. at 2910 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
98
Id at 2911.
96
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The Court's discussion, both of the Sherman Antitrust Act and of
international comity, is curious in its exclusive reference to domestic
law.99 Step by step, proposition by proposition, the Court grounded
its analysis on domestic precedents and proceeded as if no international sources or methods of analysis existed. The Court even domesticated the notion of "international comity," citing only U.S.
sources. 00
As noted in the discussion of the Aramco case above,' 0 ' there
exists an international law of prescriptive jurisdiction. This law provides a set of international principles relevant to the question of
whether the Sherman Antitrust Act can or should apply to actions
outside the United States. There is also an international law ofjudicial jurisdiction. It provides a set of principles describing the conditions under which a state may hear disputes in its courts. 0 2 Had the
Supreme Court turned to these principles, its analysis would have proceeded differently. It would, for example, have likely begun by asking
questions of prescriptive jurisdiction: whether the traditional bases of
prescriptive jurisdiction could support the U.S. assertion of Sherman
Act liability on British insurers; 0 3 whether such an assertion was reasonable;' 04 and even if reasonable, whether the interest of the United
Kingdom in regulating that same conduct was "clearly greater."' 0 5
Had it found that legislative jurisdiction was justified, the Court might
then have proceeded to ask questions about judicial jurisdiction:
whether there were sufficient contacts between the defendants, their
actions, and the U.S. courts to support a U.S. court's ability to hear
06
the case.'
99 1& at 2909 (discussing the reach of the Sherman Act and, in doing so, citing only
U.S. cases, statutes, and treatises, along with § 415 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, which describes exclusively U.S. law in
regard to the extraterritorial effect of antitrust laws).
100 1& at 2909-11. In its comity analysis, the Court cited only U.S. cases, statutes, and
treatises. Its references to the Restatement are to § 415, by its terms a description of U.S.
law, and to § 403, the only reference arguably addressing principles of international law.
101
See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supranote 14, § 421.
103
See, e.g., id. § 402 (describing territorial location of occurrence or effect, nationality

of action, and effects on important state interests as grounds for prescriptive jurisdiction);
id. § 404 (describing the commission of certain offenses of universal concern as a ground
for prescriptive jurisdiction).
104

Id. § 403(1).

Id. § 403(3). This last inquiry is appropriate only if an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is reasonable for both nations, and "one state requires what another prohibits, or
where compliance with the regulations of two states... is otherwise impossible." Id. § 403
cmt. e. One may question whether this Restatement approach truly reflects current international law. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and InternationalLaw: The Demise
of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 53, 54-56 (1995) (arguing that section 403 does
not reflect customary international law); PAUST, supra note 8, at 403 n.55.
106
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 421.
105
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The differences in approach are nicely illustrated by Justice
Scalia's dissent to this part of the case. 10 7 Following the Restatement's
mode of analysis, Justice Scalia focused primarily on the international
propriety of asserting Sherman Act liability against the British defendants (the question of prescriptive jurisdiction). 08 This analysis led
Justice Scalia to a result different from that reached by the majority:
Justice Scalia would have interpreted the Sherman Act as failing to
reach the conduct of the British defendants and thus would have dismissed the case against them. 10 9 One could argue about whether the
different approaches-majority and dissent-required different results on these facts, 110 but Scalia's dissent suggests that different results are certainly possible. As such, it is even more startling that the
majority flatly omitted any reference to the relevant international
rules.
3.

Sale

The Court had a more difficult time ignoring international law in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc."' In Sale, the respondents challenged President Clinton's order directing the Coast Guard to interdict Haitians on the high seas and return them to Haiti without first
determining whether they qualified as refugees. 112 Issues of both domestic and international law were clearly raised since both bodies of
law accord special rights to refugees. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952113 (the "Immigration Act") contains the relevant domestic rules. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1 4 (the
"Protocol"), a treaty to which the United States is a party, contains the
relevant international rules.
Yet the Court found it hard to acknowledge the international issue. "The question presented in this case," the Court began, "is
whether such forced repatriation, 'authorized to be undertaken only
beyond the territorial sea of the United States,' violates §243(h) (1) of
107 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct 2891, 2917-22 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).

108
109

Id. at 2918-21.

Id. at 2921, 2922. From Scalia's viewpoint, the majority's focus on comity and the
question of whether American courts should abstain from hearing a case against foreign
defendants, was "simply misdirected." id. at 2921.
110 See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancingof Interests, and the Exercise ofJurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the InsuranceAntitrust CasM4 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 42, 50 (1995)
(expressing uncertainty on how case should have been decided under the Restatement's
analysis).
111
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
112
Id. at 2552.
113 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980,
8 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1988).
114 Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.IAS. No. 6577.
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the [Immigration Act]." 11 5 This formulation of the question is odd,
given the obvious relevance of international law and, moreover, given
the Court's holding, in the next sentence, that neither the Immigra11 6
tion Act nor the Protocol applied to the Coast Guard's actions.
The Court's first statement of the question presented, bereft of
any reference to international law, might be viewed as an inadvertent
omission. After all, the Court devoted a substantial part of its opinion
to the international question." 7 Still, the omission is significant, because it telegraphs the Court's ambivalence about international law.
Specifically, it signals the Court's inability to decide whether the Protocol needs to be discussed at all, and if so, exactly why.
The Court introduced its discussion of the Protocol as follows:
[B]ecause the history of the [Immigration Act] ... does disclose a
general intent to conform our law to [the Protocol] .... it might be
argued that the extraterritorial obligations imposed by [the Protocol] were so clear that Congress, in acceding to the Protocol, and
then in amending the statute to harmonize the two, meant to give
the latter a correspondingly extraterritorial effect. Or, ... [the Protocol] might have established an extraterritorial obligation which
the statute does not; under the Supremacy Clause, that broader
treaty obligation might then provide the controlling rule of law.
With those possibilitiesin mind we shall consider both the text and
negotiating history of the Convention itself."18
The passage is remarkably indecisive. The Court did not commit itself
on the treaty's precise relevance. The Court merely suggested possibilities for the Protocol's relevance and "with those . . . in mind"
proceeded to discuss it. A court that took the treaty seriously would
state clearly how it fit in the logic of the decision." 9
Commentators have described the Court's holding-that the Protocol's obligations do not apply to actions of the United States taken
outside its territorial boundaries-as "eccentric, highly implausible," 20 and "seriously flawed,"'121 and by Justice Blackmun, the sole

115

SaI4 113 S. Ct. at 2552 (foomote omitted).

116

Id.

117

Id at 2562-67.
Id at 2562 (emphasis added) (foomote omitted).
Lower courts had held that respondents could not invoke the Protocol because it

118

119

was not "self-executing." M at 2556-57. This, along with later Congressional action-the
relevant provisions of the Immigration Act-certainly muddied the Protocol's status in the
Sale litigation. The crucial point, however, is that the Court side-stepped these issues
rather than tackling them directly.
120

Louis Henkin, Notesfrom the Presiden ASIL NEwsL (Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Washington,

D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 7.
121

Thomas D.Jones, IntemationalDecision, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 114, 126 (1994).
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dissenter in Sale, as "extraordinary."'12 2 But like the other cases reviewed here, the real significance of the Court's opinion lies not in
123
the substance of its holding, but in the approach.
The case squarely presented an issue of treaty interpretation, an
issue for which the international law of treaties is undoubtedly relevant. And yet the majority never mentioned the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, nor, for that matter, any other source on the
international law of treaties. 124 Instead, the Court proceeded on exactly the same grounds, using exactly the same methods, as one would
expect a court to pursue in a purely domestic case of statutory interpretation. It examined the text and its negotiating history. 125 But the
international rules of treaty interpretation differ from the domestic
rules of statutory interpretation. 12 6 Justice Blackmun's dissent carefully demonstrated how those differences in approach could have led
127
to a different result.
C.

The Lessons

These four cases-Alvarez-Machain,Aramco, Hartford,and Sale--do
more than demonstrate the consistency of the Supreme Court's provincialism; they illustrate how each of provincialism's forms actually
manifests itself in the work of U.S. courts. In Alvarez-Machain, the
Court suggested that the existence of a customary law violation and its
possible remedy are properly left to the executive branch12 8-a clear
example ofjurisdictional provincialism. The same form of provincialism played a role in Sale. At the end of that opinion, the Court suggested that its territorial reading of the Immigration Act and the
Protocol was particularly justified because the situation involved "foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility." 129 Then, quoting an earlier case from the D.C. Circuit, the
Court concluded that "[a]lthough the human crisis is compelling,
there is no solution to be found in ajudicial remedy."' 30 This fatalistic willingness to leave international law unvindicated in the courts
122 Sale 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see also Blackmun, supranote 47,
at 43-45 (discussing the Sale case and concluding that the Court's decision renders the
Refugee Convention "a cruel hoax").
123 An approach Justice Blackmun in dissent labeled, by turns, "unsupported," "peculiar," and "flawed." Id at 2569-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124
Cf. id at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the Vienna Convention).
125
Id. at 2563-67.
126
See supra note 63.
127
Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2569-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992).
129
113 S. Ct at 2567.
130 Id. (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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because the executive branch is available to deal with the problem
forms a recurrent theme in American jurisprudence.
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court was unwilling to find the
existence of a customary rule regarding abductions, 13 1 and this unwillingness effectively prevented the Court from applying customary law
as its rule of decision-a clear example of doctrinal provincialism.
The same form of provincialism appeared in Aramco, Hartford, and
Sale. In each case, there existed a relevant body of international law
that the Court could have cited, discussed, and applied. In each case,
however, the Court proceeded as if the only relevant question was the
proper interpretation of a congressional act. One might speculate
that the Court's repeated willingness to by-pass international analysis
pays subtle homage to the rules that later congressional acts trump
prior treaty and customary law. There is little point in discussing international law or determining its content if congressional action will
ultimately control. This suggests that the rules constituting doctrinal
provincialism work on at least two levels: they cause courts explicitly
to reject international rules in favor of domestic ones, and, more subtly, they discourage courts from explicating international rules in the
first place.
The recurring judicial argument that the executive branch can
best resolve international legal problems, together with the existence
of many rules that prevent international law from providing the rule
of decision in American cases, encourage courts to treat international
cases as if they were domestic ones. In this manner, jurisdictional and
doctrinal provincialism feed a provincialism of method. Indeed,
methodological provincialism is the most striking feature of the four
cases just reviewed. In case after case, each with obvious international
ramifications, the Supreme Court asked domestic questions, cited domestic precedents, and gave domestic answers.
III
WHY PROVINCIALISM IS A PROBLEM

Provincialism is destructive. It harms litigants, damages courts
and hurts the United States as a whole. It corrodes international law
and undercuts the rule of law. But it does not do so all at once. The
different forms of provincialism breed characteristically different
harms, and a proper assessment of provincialism must take account of
these differences.

131

See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666-67.
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The Harms of Methodological Provincialism

The peculiar harm of methodological provincialism is the embarrassment of error. The practice of treating international cases or international law in purely domestic terms is simply a mistake. Domestic
law and international law are different, and to treat them the same is
to confuse two distinct systems of law. Most of this confusion appears
to stem from ignorance. For example, a court might mishandle the
sources of international law based on an assumption that they resemble domestic sources. 132 Mistakes based on ignorance, of course, reflect badly on the courts, because they suggest carelessness or
incompetence. Yet methodological provincialism is no less harmful
when it results from deliberate decisions to exclude relevant international legal analysis or to apply domestic methods to international
materials. 133 These are still errors; willfulness only adds to the vice of
their commission.
If mistakes of method do not affect the outcome of a case, the
harm stops at the embarrassment of ajob poorly done. If, in contrast,
mistakes of method do affect the outcome of a case, the harms begin
to mount. In addition to the embarrassment of error, one must add
harm to a litigant who should have won but did not; harm to the
United States, which may incur liability for the violation of one of its
international obligations; and the harm to international law, which
goes unvindicated.13 4 Each of these harms, more characteristic of
doctrinal provincialism, will be discussed presently.
B.

The Harms of Doctrinal Provincialism
1. A Short Survey

Typically, doctrinal provincialism arises when rules from both international law and domestic law are known to a court and the court
consciously chooses to apply the latter. 3 5 There is here no "embarrassment of error" of the type associated with methodological provincialism. Nevertheless, the court's conscious choice to apply domestic
rules is likely to determine the outcome of the case; if it did not, there
would be little reason to make the choice at all. Contrary domestic
law having been applied, international rights are left unvindicated or
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
133 See infra part IVA (suggesting that the reasons behind a willful adoption of methodological provincialism-xenophobia, sloth and rhetorical advantage-deserve no more
praise than ignorance).
134
See infra part HI.B.
135 See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193 (1888) (domestic legislation supersedes treaty obligation); Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)
(domestic law controls when a treaty is not self-executing).
132
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international obligations are left unenforced. This invites several distinct harms.
a. Harm to DeservingLitigants
Generally speaking, the law recognizes that persons are entitled
to redress when they suffer harm from the illegal acts of others. 136
That principle is violated, however, when a litigant fails to gain redress
for government actions that breach a treaty obligation on the ground
either that the treaty is not self-executing 3 7 or that it has been superseded by later congressional legislation.' 3 8 The principle is likewise
violated when a litigant fails to gain redress for government actions
that violate customary international law on the ground that controlling executive action has superseded the custom.' 3 9 In each case, the
wrongdoer escapes the consequences of its illegal conduct and the
victim is left without legal remedy.
b.

Harm to the United States

When a U.S. court fails to vindicate an international right or to
enforce an international obligation, the court's failure is attributed to
the nation as a whole, and the nation is held responsible. 4° The
court's failure may itself violate international law,14 1 or, more com136 In regard to domestic law: "As a general principle, whenever there is a wrongful
breach of an agreement or invasion of a right, the law infers some damage, and the innocent person should have a remedy." MARTIN WEINSTEIN, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 190
(3d ed. 2d prig. 1989). A similar rule applies in the international system. See, e.g., HENKIN
Er AL., supra note 6, at 544-45.
137 E.g., Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 50 (1913) (treaty on industrial property); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir.) (Convention on the
High Seas), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495
(4th Cir.) (patent provision in Treaty of Versailles), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 571 (1929).
138 E.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889) (congressional
act excluding Chinese nationals supersedes prior treaty with China); Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (determining later
congressional funding of contras supersedes prior treaty obligation under U.N. Charter);
Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461,465 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (ruling later congressional statute supersedes U.N. Security Council embargo on Rhodesian products), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (finding later congressional
statute supersedes prior treaty with Germany), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
139 E.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889
(1986).
140
RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115(1) (b) (stating thatjudicial preference for later
congressional act does not relieve U.S. of its international obligations or of the consequences for violations of those obligations); BROWNLIE, upra note 14, at 449-50, 529-30
(arguing that actions of national courts can engage state's international responsibility).
141
The international wrong, "denial ofjustice," is peculiarly the province of a nation's
courts. States are responsible for injuries to aliens resulting from: "a denial, unwarranted
delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency in the administration ofjudicial or
remedial process ... or a manifestly unjustjudgrnent." HARvARD LAw SCHOOL, RESEARCH
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE LAW OF RESPONSIBILrY OF STATES FOR DAMAGE DONE IN THEIR
TERRITORY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF FOREIGNERS, art. 9 (1929), repinted in 23 AM.J.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

monly, preclude it from correcting or ameliorating presidential and
congressional violations. When Congress passes a law that is inconsistent with one of the United States' international obligations, courts
can ameliorate-or even eradicate-the harm by refusing to enforce
the legislation. But they cannot do so if they take the position that
later congressional legislation supersedes treaty and customary law.' 42
When the President or other members of the executive branch violate
the United States' international obligations, the courts can ameliorate
the harm by refusing to enforce the offending directive in court, by
enjoining the executive branch from taking enforcement action on its
own, or by awarding damages to the harmed plaintiffs. But they cannot do so if they take the position that executive action trumps treaty
or custom, 1 4 3 or if they are hesitant to find the existence of any custom at all.1"'
A doctrinal provincialism that increases the frequency of U.S. violations of international law has important consequences. The first is
reputational. Throughout its history, the United States has publicly
supported the rule of law in international affairs. 145 Judicial policies
that create or countenance violations of international law obviously
undercut the nation's credibility on this point. 146 In addition, these
violations sometimes cost money: reparations must be paid, or money
must be spent to return a situation to the status quo ante. 14 7 Sometimes the cost inheres in suffering the retaliatory action of an offended state. 148 Sometimes the cost is more indirect, but no less
real-such as the creation of ill-will among allies-a cost paid in future relations with the governments concerned) 49
173 (Special Supp. 1929). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 711(b) cmt. a
(on denial ofjustice); BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 529-30 (same).
142
See supra notes 31, 34 (citing cases taking that position).
143
See Garcia-Mir,788 F.2d at 1453 (ruling that executive action trumps customary
international law).
144
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
INT'L L.

145
See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 53, 62-63 (2d
ed. 1979).
146 See id. at 52.
147 International law firmly establishes the requirement of reparations. E.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.CJ., Report of Judgments, Advisory Opinions with Orders, 174, 181 (Apr. 11) (Advisory Opinion); Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9); Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47-48 (Sept. 13); Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26). See alsoF.A Mann, The Consequences of an InternationalWrong
in Internationaland NationalLaw, 48 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1976-77).
148
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 905 (describing countermeasures in response to
international legal violations);JuLius STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

288-93 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1973) (1954) (describing responsive methods short of
war); ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION 13567 (1985) (describing unilateral measures with special reference to U.S. practice).
149 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, for example, the
government of Mexico threatened to halt its cooperation with the United States in drug
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c. Harm to United States Courts

Doctrinal provincialism visits a special harm on U.S. courts. At
base, it tends to involve them in violations of law by causing them
either to violate international law themselves or to countenance such
violations by the executive and legislative branches. But a court must
always stand, ultimately, for the rule of law. When it does not, it loses
its distinctive character, and thereby its distinctive worth, as an
institution. 15 0
This harm is so easily stated that its significance can be overlooked. The value of courts as courts lies precisely in their dedication
to the rule of law. They find their primary justification as a separate
institution in their willingness to support law and the lawful resolution
of disputes. When, instead, they countenance illegality, when they approach the resolution of disputes with the same casualness about the
rule of law that sometimes marks other political institutions, they fail
in the very duty that distinguishes them from others.
d.

Harm to InternationalLaw

Doctrinal provincialism harms international law in two ways.
First, it chokes off an important method of enforcement. Historically,
municipal courts have played an important role in the enforcement of
international law, and that importance is likely to continue in the future. 15 1 When U.S. courts refuse to apply international law, they help
to debilitate one of its most important enforcement mechanisms.
Second, doctrinal provincialism corrodes the very system of international law. The efficacy, and even existence, of any legal system depends on the general willingness of its subjects to obey its norms.
International law is no different in this regard, and, indeed, the small
number and nature of its subjects magnifies the importance of each
subject's behavior-.152 Any course of conduct that repeatedly violates
international law, or that condones its violation, not only destabilizes
the laws that are broken, but destabilizes the system as a whole. The
control efforts and sent a Mexican patrol into U.S. territory, without U.S. consent, to arrest
a fugitive. Bush, supra note 50, at 971; see supra part ilA (discussing Alvarez-Machain).
Nations not directly involved in the abduction have also threatened a chilling of relations
with the United States. See Bush, supra note 50, at 942; Stewart, supra note 51, at 50.
150 See Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies, 67 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 581,592 (1993) (warning that "courts cannot risk the fate of becoming irrelevant in
their crucial role of applying the law as an instrument ofjustice.").
151
See, e.g., BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC

LEGAL SysmMs 8-9 (Rene Provost trans., 1993); RicHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER Xi-Xii (1964).
152 See, e.g., Stanley Hoffiann, InternationalLaw and the Control of Force, in THE RELEvANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 21, 34-41 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1971).
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doctrinal provincialism of U.S. courts clearly harms the international
system.
2.

Discountingthe Harms, and the Limits ofjudicial Indfference

The harms of doctrinal provincialism-to litigants, to the courts,
to the United States, and to international law-are well known and
largely undisputed. The real issue is their seriousness: are these bad
things all that bad?
Consider first the harm to international law. The importance of
international law is, perhaps, self-evident to most readers of this journal, and harm to it presumptively bad. An important intellectual tradition, however, holds that the rule of law is not-or ought not berelevant to the behavior of states. Instead, power and national interest
(suitably defined) governs-or ought to govern-the relations of
states.15 3 This tradition is founded upon serious thinking about politics and law and is understandably attractive to those who reside in
(and help to govern) the most powerful nation on earth. An argument against doctrinal provincialism, based on its harm to international law, simply will not persuade thinkers in this tradition.
Doctrinal provincialism's harms to the United States, to its courts,
and to its litigants can be discounted in similar ways. If one seriously
doubts the importance of international law, or seriously doubts the
prudence of promoting it, then increased violations of that law will be
of little consequence. Any resulting harm to the United States or to
its courts is discounted. Any sense of injustice to litigants is diminished for they lose nothing they "should have" received.
But can courts take these views? Although one can understand
the political or diplomatic inclination to deny the existence or to discount the importance of international law, courts begin with different
assumptions. Law-denying or law-minimizing views have little place in
an institution dedicated to the rule of law. It is thus not terribly surprising that the language of The Paquete Habana 54 has found
resonance in U.S. courts. International law, the Court there instructs,
"must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of ap153
This view of international relations, usually called "realism," was famously developed and defended in Hans Morgenthau's classic 1948 book, PoliticsAmongNations, now in
its sixth edition. HANs J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLmcs AMONG NATIONS (6th ed. 1985). Although the realist view has suffered serious criticism over the past
40 years, it still dominates the works of political scientists, who, in the face of the criticism,
either modify it ("neorealism"), or reject it in favor of other theories (e.g., "multilateralism" or "liberal institutionalism"). See, e.g., NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1986) (presenting challenges to realist claims); see also, e.g., MULTLATERALISM
MATRs (John G. Ruggie ed., 1993) (exploring the multilateralism concept); NEO-REAuSM
AND NEo-LamERAIisM (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (exploring neo-realist and neo-liberal
theory).
154 175 U.S. 677 (1990).
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propriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." 5 5 If,in our courts'
own traditions, international law is not only law, but our law, then the
harms of doctrinal provincialism return in full virulence. A court
must be concerned if its actions place the United States in violation of
international law. A court must be concerned if it finds itself supporting the international violations of the Congress or the President. A
court must be concerned if it turns away litigants with legitimate
claims based on international law.
The Harms ofJurisdictionalProvincialism

C.
1.

The Old Harms, Revisited

When a court refuses to hear a case with international implications, it risks the same sort of harms-to litigants, to the court itself, to
the United States, and to international law-as when it chooses to apply domestic law in preference to applicable international law. But
unlike the case of doctrinal provincialism, these harms are
contingent.
Litigants are harmed only when their claims are well-founded in
international law and they are nonetheless turned away. If their
claims are not well-founded, a court's refusal to hear the case does not
rob the litigants of a remedy they would otherwise have received. The
courts are harmed only when they act callously or opportunistically:
because they do not reach the merits of a given case, they are not put
in the position, explicitly, of themselves violating international law or
condoning its violation by others; they can only be suspected of disregarding the effects of their actions, or intending to achieve an unworthy end by a "neutral" procedural means. The United States is
harmed only when the court's refusal to hear a case itself violates international law (an unlikely circumstance, because international law
seldom requires a nation's courts to hear particular cases) 156 or when,
because of that refusal, a previous U.S. violation of international law
remains unvindicated. Finally, international law is harmed only when
it was both relevant to the case and in fact violated: only then is international law "unvindicated."
The harms generated by a court's refusal to hear an international
case are not only contingent, but speculative as well. The harms depend on certain facts about the case at hand, facts that are typically
determined at the merits stage of a proceeding. Because the court, by
definition, does not reach the merits, the existence of these facts is
uncertain. In any particular case, it will be a matter for argument, for
155
156

Id. at 700.
See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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example, whether a rule of international law was properly applicable,
whether it had been violated, and what the proper remedy might have
been. One cannot be sure that an injustice was done, or that the
United States violated international law, or that international law was
left unvindicated.
Marked by contingency and speculation, the harms of jurisdictional provincialism are easy to discount. Still, when a court refuses to
hear an international case, it inevitably risks harms to the litigants, to
the courts, to the United States, and to international law. One must
suppose, therefore, that these harms sometimes occur. An increased
willingness to hear international cases would reduce the risk of harm
57
and the frequency of its actual occurrence.1
2.

Harm to the Rule of Law

As the previous subsection demonstrated, jurisdictional provincialism risks the same kinds of harms as doctrinal provincialism, albeit
more contingently and speculatively. A court's refusal to hear international cases also risks a harm not found in provincialism's other forms.
When a court consciously chooses to apply domestic law instead of
international law to a case (the mark of doctrinal provincialism), it
still chooses to apply law. When a court refuses to hear the case at all
(the mark of jurisdictional provincialism), it reduces the chances of a
lawful settlement. In this way, the court harms the rule of law.
If legal rights go unvindicated in U.S. courts, they may not be
vindicated at all, resulting in an indisputable loss of justice.' 58
Although other courts, foreign or international, may eventually vindicate those rights, a U.S. court has no assurance of this result when it
simply refuses to hear the case. In addition, a delay in justice is unavoidable. Cases rejected by U.S. courts may be settled outside of
courts, but the judicial settlement of disputes has special virtues: a
unique concern for rules, consistently applied, and for fairness to the
parties. Judicial settlement is also peaceful-an important advantage
in the international system, a system in which self-help is well-accepted, many of the players are armed, and those who choose to fight
157
There are dangers, of course, in an overzealous willingness to hear international
cases. An overeager court might, for example, overstep its legitimate authority to hear a

case under international law. See REs-rATEMEWT, supranote 14, § 421 (describing limitations
on jurisdiction to adjudicate). And a court, having decided to hear an international case,
might get the law wrong, harming an innocent litigant and placing the United States in
violation of its international obligations. Such consequences arguably followed the
Supreme Court's decisions in Alvarez-Machain, Hartford,and SaI4 discussed suprapart ll.B.
158
This is justice as compensation, not justice as fairness, although the two conceptions are related. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1667 (2d ed. 1994); see a/sOJOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OFJuSTicE 3-9 (1971) (contrastingjustice as fairness with compensatory
justice); ERNFsTJ. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRiVATE LAw 61-63 (distinguishing between corrective and distributive justice).
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are seldom the ones who die. It would be ludicrous to suggest that
each exercise of jurisdictional provincialism risks war, but it does risk
injustice, and a delay in justice is almost assured.
IV

THE CAUSES OF PROVINCIALISM
(AND THE WISDOM OF A CURE)

Judicial provincialism is a puzzling phenomenon. It risks many
harms, the bulk of which are particularly unsettling for courts. 159 It
flies in the face of constitutional 16 0 and Supreme Court 16 1 language
that seems to thrust international law directly into the American
courtroom. And, it suggests an obliviousness both to the growing
stream of transnational intercourse and to the burgeoning corpus of
international law that regulates it.162 Why, then, does provincialism
flourish? Why is it that, when one turns to American cases, one sees

international law blocked, side-stepped, or ignored at almost every
turn?
The first answer is that, despite its growing relevance and its formal acceptance in the U.S. legal system, international law is burdened
by several features that render it an unlikely source of guidance in
domestic litigation.
(1) It is unknown. Few judges and lawyers approach their work
with a solid grounding in the substance and methods of international law.
(2) It is not raised. Even if known, lawyers seldom have an interest
in pressing the international legal aspects of a case and judges seldom have an interest in raising them on their own.
(3) It is unusual. Both lawyers and judges lack experience in handling international issues and are ill-disposed to explore unfamiliar

territory.
(4) It is foreign. International law comes from abroad and may
not be well-fitted to the American experience.
(5) It is undemocratic. International law is generated in ways far
removed from the citizens of the United States and, indeed, from
the citizens of other nations.
(6) It is not law. International law is generated in ways that call
into question its status as "law."
(7) It is not applicable. International law speaks primarily to
states, which are seldom litigants.
159

See supra part III.

160
161

U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land.").
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (describing international law as

"part of our law").

162

See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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(8) It is trumped by domestic law. The actions of domestic institutions have long been held to supersede international law in a variety
of circumstances.
(9) It is not persuasive. Given a lack of notoriety and dubious relevance, international law is not nearly so persuasive a ground ofjudgment as domestic law.
(10) It is not appropriate. The determination and application of
international law is more properly left to others: the executive, the
legislature, foreign courts, or international tribunals.
This heady mix of reasons-founded upon considerations as
wide-ranging as practical experience, philosophical rumination, legal
doctrine, and raw xenophobia-help to explain why judges seem almost reflexively to eschew international law. It should not surprise us
that men and women of practical affairs are reluctant to pursue a line
of analysis about which they know little, which is seldom brought to
their attention, whose mastery requires a substantial investment of
time, and whose ultimate usefulness is open to question.
Taken together, this list helps to explain, in a general way, why
U.S. judges are inclined to ignore or to side-step international law.
But a deeper analysis is warranted. As we have seen, international law
is marginalized in three distinct ways. Each form of provincialism
grows out of a particular context and has developed for characteristically different reasons. Sorting out those contexts and reasons is important, not only for analytical precision, but for what it tells us about
the likelihood-and wisdom-of change.
A.

Methodological Provincialism

The tendency to treat international cases as if they were domestic
ones grows primarily out of ignorance. Courts often fail to address
the international legal aspects of a case because they are unaware of
them. Courts often misapprehend the sources of international law, or
mishandle international materials, because they assume that the
sources and methods of international law are the same as domestic
163
sources and methods.
The four Supreme Court cases reviewed in Part II-AlvarezMachain, Aramco, Hartford, and Sale--suggest, however, that there is
more to methodological provincialism than ignorance. It simply does
not seem plausible to attribute to four successive majorities of the
Supreme Court an unfamiliarity with international law generally, or
163

Judges, of course, do not deserve the sole blame for this ignorance. The responsi-

bility lies also with lawyers, who fail to raise relevant international issues or who themselves
mishandle the sources; with law clerks, on whose thoroughness of research and analysis
judges must often rely; and with law professors, who bear an obligation to equip the bench

and bar with the knowledge and tools needed for their work.
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with the specific rules of international law relevant to those decisions.
Dissents in at least two of the cases16 4 demonstrate that some of the
Justices were aware of these matters, and indicate that the Court as a
whole had the relevant knowledge or the means to obtain it.
A lack of seasoning, rather than a lack of knowledge, may therefore explain many mistakes of method. International cases are rare in
any court, even the Supreme Court. 165 Because the structure,
method, and citation practice of domestic legal argument is far more
familiar to our courts than those of international law, it is quite natural for our courts to fall into the more familiar patterns of thought
and analysis even when they know that international law is at issue.
But lack of seasoning may not explain all judicial errors. In reading cases like Alvarez-Machain, Aramco, Hartford, and Sale, one is
tempted to conclude thatjudges sometimes make deliberate-though
unannounced-decisions to exclude international legal issues from
consideration or to apply to those issues a domestic methodology.
This suggestion, however, leads down a dark and messy path. For
what reasons might a court deliberately choose to ignore international
law or argue about it as if it were a species of domestic law? Such a
court might be motivated by a general suspicion of things foreign, an
unwillingness to spend the time needed to uncover and analyze international materials, or a fear that international argument, even if correct, will be unpersuasive. But xenophobia, sloth, and rhetorical
expediency are not the sorts of motivations one properly attributes to
judges. Faced with unexplained examples of methodological provincialism, a presumption of good faith suggests that we attribute mistakes to a lack of knowledge or seasoning.
The causes underlying methodological provincialism suggest that
it is, in principle, very easy to change. Lack of knowledge and lack of
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2917-22 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis164
senting in part); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567-77 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 Although counting international cases is no science, the Supreme Court seems to
be averaging two substantive opinions per year. In the past five years, for example, the
Court has decided the four cases discussed in Part II, along with six others: Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (foreign sovereign immunity); Argentina v. Weltover, 504
U.S. 607 (1992) (foreign sovereign immunity); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530
(1991) (Warsaw Convention); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (act of state doctrine); Argentine Rep. v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (jurisdiction). The total number of
signed, written opinions by the Supreme Court has been running at something over 100
opinions per term. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-LeadingCases, 107 HARV. L. REv.
144, 376 (1993) (reporting 114 written opinions during 1992 term); The Supreme Court,
1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARv.L. Rrv. 163, 382 (1992) (reporting 114 written opinions during 1991 term); cf.LEE EPSTEIN Er AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 73
(1994) (number of signed opinions during the 1989-92 terms ranged from 107 to 129).
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seasoning have straightforward antidotes: education and practice.
Judges and lawyers alike need a serious education in international law,
beginning in law school and continuing with post-graduate training. 166 An effective educational effort would take money and commitment, and for that reason may be slow to develop and hard to sustain,
but it is in form eminently possible and perfectly fitted to the challenge of reducing methodological provincialism. No precedents need
to be overturned, no venerable theories of American government
need to be attacked and discarded; nothing is needed but a simple
spreading of the word.
The causes underlying methodological provincialism also suggest
that it should be changed. Although its harms can be discounted,
there is nothing on the other side of the balance to justify the practice. A lack ofjudicial knowledge (or sloth, xenophobia, or rhetorical
expediency) might explain or account for errors of method, but do
not justify them. When all the explanatory clutter is cleared away, a
mistake is still a mistake. This makes easy work of the normative analysis: methodological provincialism is unambiguously bad.
B.

Doctrinal Provincialism

Doctrinal provincialism-the tendency to exclude international
rules as the rules of decision in American cases-presents a different
situation. It does not grow out of ignorance. It instead reflects serious thinking about the role of international law in the domestic legal
system. Each element of doctrinal provincialism fleshes out the meaning of the claim that "[i]nternational law is part of our law.' 67 Do
treaties come in? If so, under what circumstances? Are U.S. courts to
168
apply international custom? If so, when?
The answers are informed by jurisprudence, the Constitution,
and international law itself. Such grounds are not as easy to condemn
as ignorance and, if found wanting, are harder to correct. Any change
will require a rethinking of some longstanding, traditional views on
jurisprudence and American government. Furthermore, traditions
often find expression in precedent, and the modification or reversal
of precedent is never an easy task. Still, as I will argue, change is both
166 Part V sketches the outline of such a program. See infra Part V.
167 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983) (citing Paquete Habana); Skiriotes v. Florida, 318 U.S. 69, 72 (1941) (same).
168 See generally Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the NationalLaw of the
United States (pt. 1), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952) (reviewing the progress and position of
the law of nations in the United States); Henkin, supra note 31 (examining the integration
of international and domestic law); Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of InternationalLaw in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932) (same).
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possible and desirable. There are many harms in doctrinal provincialism and its grounds are not nearly so firm as is often imagined.
1.

The JurisprudentialSources

Reflections about the nature of law and, more specifically, the
proper conceptual relation between international and domestic law,
play a large role in doctrinal provincialism. For many years, these reflections were characterized by a metaphysical debate between monists and dualists: a debate between those who posit the existence of
just one legal system, of which international law and national law are
constituent parts, and those who posit the existence of several legal
systems, each with its own ability to set the conditions under which it
takes account of the others.1 69 The debate has grown stale in recent
years, not only because lawyers have a limited attention span for meta70
physics, but because the dualists soundly thrashed the monists.
But the dualist victory did not answer the substantive question; it
simply settled the question's form: under what conditions, and in
what ways, will U.S. law take account of international law? In answering this question, conceptual reasoning remains important. Indeed,
two lines of jurisprudential thought have greatly influenced U.S.
courts' treatment of international law. The following subsections examine them in turn.
a. Positivism
Over 150 years ago, John Austin famously declared that law, properly so called, consisted of the commands of a sovereign.' 7 ' Today,
commands of the sovereign are understood to mean the authoritative
i7 2
pronouncements of the lawfully constituted government of a state.
Law, from the positivist perspective, is contingent, essentially political,
and properly separated from morality. In both its earliest and current
169
See, e.g., HANs KILsE, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 363-88 (Anders
Wedberg trans., Atheneum Publishers, Inc. 1961) (1945); ALF Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-73 (1947); Edwin Borchard, Relation Between InternationalLaw and Municipal Law, 27 VA. L. REV. 137 (1940); J.G. Stark, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of
InternationalLaw, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66.
170 SeeJAs, supra note 32, at 83-84.
171 JOHN AusTrN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 198-99 (1832) ("Every
positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a
sovereign body of persons .... ").
172 See Beau James Brock, Mr.JusticeAntonin Scalia: A Renaissance ofPositivism and Predictability in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623, 632 (1991) ("The legal positivist
holds that only positive law, those juridical norms which have been established by the authority of the state, is law."); Reginald Parker, Legal Positivism, 32 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31,
35 (1956) (arguing only positive law is law, and "positive law" means those legal norms
created by authority of the state; thus everything state authority creates is law). Leading
contemporary formulations of positivism can be found in HART, supranote 158 andJosEPH
RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SxYSTm (2d ed. 1980).
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versions, positivism finds law by examining the law-making activity of
government officials and never (as natural law theory sometimes
does) by reasoning deductively from first principles. 173 So understood, positivism is the working faith of most contemporary lawyers
74
andjudges.'
This view, unremarkable in many of its ramifications, has important consequences for international law. It calls into question the very
status of that law and thus provides the groundwork upon which doctrinal provincialism can flourish. There is, in the international system,
neither a sovereign to issue commands nor a supranational state
whose organs issue authoritative pronouncements of law. 175 This suggests that international law is not law at all, but something else; Austin,
1 76
in fact, called it "positive morality."
For the positivist, international law founded on custom or general principles of law is especially suspect. Treaties are based on the
explicit consent of the states concerned-based, that is, on affirmative
acts of sovereign states. Although they do not arise out of a supranational government, and thus remain questionable, treaties can be understood to make law in the same way that private individuals, by
contract, make law in a domestic system. Custom and general principles of law, in contrast, are doubly disabled. Not only do they fail, like
treaties, to issue from a supranational authority, but their modes of
creation (state practice and opiniojuris, and the concordant internal
practices of civilized nations) do not constitute authoritative, governmental pronouncements of international legal judgments or rules.
173

In Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court stated:
But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without
some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced
in a State... is not the common law generally but the law of that State

existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have
been in England or anywhere else.
The authority and only authority is the State.
Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); cf. 1 WILUAM
BLACSTONE, COMMENTAmES *38-41 (discussing first principles of the law of nature).
174 See, e.g., RONALD DWORIuN, TAXING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 16 (1977) (stating positivism

is accepted "by most working and academic lawyers who hold views on jurisprudence.");
AuTHoRrAIuAN 17 (1986) ("[L]awyers today
all act as... positivists from time to time, and with some conviction"); David Millon, Positivism in the Historiographyof the Common Law,- 1989 Wis. L. REV. 669, 670 n.3 ("[P] ositivism
remains the dominant way of thinking about what law is and ought to be in the United
States as well as in Great Britain.").
175 STONE, supranote 148, at 17-18; Roberto Ago, Positive Law and InternationalLaw, 51
AM.J. INT'L L. 691, 700-07 (1957); see also HART, supra note 158, at 3-4 (describing international law as a "doubtful case( ]" of law).
176 AUSTIN, supra note 171, at 148.
JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHoRrrATIVE AND THE
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A nascent commitment to positivism helps explain why judges
often accord international law only that level of effectiveness that the
7 7 It
Constitution and congressional statutes indisputably require.'
also helps explain particular elements of doctrinal provincialism:
first, the judicial reluctance to find the existence of customary law or
general principles of law, neither of which fits neatly into the positivist
paradigm of authoritative governmental pronouncement; and second,
the judicial inclination to treat congressional acts-authoritative pronouncements of the state-as superior to any form of international
law. Turning to cases, a nascent commitment to positivism helps explain Alvarez-Machain's concentration on treaty law to the virtual exclusion of custom.' 7 8 Likewise, such a commitment to positivism
helps explain the Court's failure even to acknowledge the customary
law of prescriptive jurisdiction in Aramco and Hartford, or the customary law of refugees in Sale.' 79 For the positivist, treaties count more
8 0
than custom.
But positivism is riddled with problems. It has come under increasing attack throughout this century from many different
quarters.' 8 ' There have been calls to reject it in favor of a revitalized
theory of natural law,' 8 2 which positivism was thought to replace, or to
reject it in favor of still newer theories of law. 183 Even more signifi177 Treaties fare best in U.S. law because the Constitution specifically makes them the
"supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Customary rules reliably form a
basis for U.S. decision-making only when Congress invites the practice, as it does, for example, in the Alien Tort Statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988); see, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
178 See supra part IIA
179

See supra part II.B.

180 The commitment to positivism also explains, in all four cases, the Court's almost
fanatical devotion to its own case law: its consistent practice of citing its own cases even in
support of international legal propositions. This reflects a positivist viewpoint: Supreme
Court decisions issue from an authoritative organ of a government, whereas the traditional
sources of international law do not.
181
See, e.g., RONALD DWOIutN, LAW's EMPIRE 31-44 (1986); SAMUEL I. SHUMAN, LEGAL
PosrrmwsM: ITS SCOPE AND LIMrrATIONS 27 (1963) (describing legal positivism as "afflicted
with [an] ... incompleteness or inadequacy"); Henry Mather, Legal Positivismand American

Case Law, 38 U. FlA. L. REV. 615, 615-16 (1986) (arguing that "contemporary positivism is
incompatible with the realities of American case law."); Reginald Parker, Legal Positivism,

32 NoTRE DAME LAw. 31, 34-42 (1956-57). Positivists themselves have criticized and modified Austin's "sovereign command" version of the theory. See generally, e.g, H.LA HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (containing the preeminent analysis and qualification

of Austinian positivism).
182 E.g., JOHN FiNNiS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); see also Robert P.
George, Recent Criticism of NaturalLaw Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Heidi M.
Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justifie, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203, 2222-23 (1992) (utilizing a
natural law perspective).
183 Recent strands of thought include critical legal studies, law and economics, feministjurisprudence, and critical race theory. See generally EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF
LAW 539-686 (1994) (giving representative samples of writings in each of these traditions).
Some of these traditions give an entirely different answer to the question "What is Law?".
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cantly, a common ground of attack has been the observation that
there is more (or less) to law than the command of a sovereign, more
(or less) to law than the authoritative pronouncements of state organs. 184 In other words, critics have called into question the very as185
pect of positivism most damaging to international law.
Furthermore, even if some version of positivism is accepted as an
adequate account of domestic law, this does not mean that positivism
adequately describes other systems of law. That which fruitfully describes domestic law need not fruitfully describe international law.
Once this connection is broken, the positivistic attack on international
law is exposed as the banal observation that international law is not
the same as national law. The positivistic attack on international law is
compelling only if we assume that national law is the paradigm in
terms of which all other systems of law must be understood. But it is
not clear why this should be so. We might just as easily assume, for
example, that international law is the paradigm for "law" and conclude that domestic law is not "law" at all, but something else. If this
seems like word-play and the conclusion seems ludicrous, it is equally
a matter of word-play, and equally ludicrous, to claim that international law is not "law" because it does not work like domestic legal
186
systems.
b. Black-Box Theory
Doctrinal provincialism is also driven by an idea that can be described as the "black-box" theory of international legal obligation.
This theory conceives international law as imposing its obligations
only on each state as a whole, and not on any of its constituent organs.
Others appear to make the answer irrelevant or much less interesting. For the effect of
these new theories on international law, see, for example, Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 Am.J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); David Kennedy, A New
Stream of InternationalLaw Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 (1988) (analyzing public international law); Fernando R. Teson, Feminism and InternationalLaw: A Reply, 33 VA.J. INT'L L.
647 (1993) (critiquing international law from a liberal and feminist perspective).
184 H.LA. Hart argues that Austinian theory does not, among other things, adequately
account for several types of law. HART, supra note 158, at 18-49. Ronald Dworkin argues
that even Hart's more sophisticated version of positivism still focuses too exclusively on law
as rules and fails, therefore, to account for the meaningful expression and application of
principles by judges and lawyers. DWORMN, supra note 174, at 14-80.
185 It is significant that Hart's version of positivism, shorn of the "sovereign command"
theory of law, is much kinder to international law. HART, supra note 158, at 211-31.
186 See, e.g., Glanville L. Williams, InternationalLaw and the Controversy Concerning the
Word "Law,"22 BaRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1945); see also Roger Fisher, BringingLaw to Bear on
Governments, 74 HARv. L. RE.v. 1130-31 (1961) (questioning a definition of law as'superior
force and suggesting a method for strengthening the role of international law); Gidon
Gottlieb, The Nature of InternationalLaw: Toward a Second Concept of Law, in 4 THE FtrruRE
oF THE INTERNATiONAL LEGAL ORDER 331 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1972)
(arguing for a concept of law that acknowledges horizontal systems and that thus accounts
for international law).

PROVINCJALISM

19951

It is a matter for each state to determine which of its organs shall
execute the nation's international responsibilities, and each of those
organs, consequently, must await an internal signal to operate. For
judges, this means that international law has no independent authority in the courtroom.
Black-box theory made an early appearance in American jurisprudence and has remained a common feature of judicial reasoning to
this day. In 1829, for example, when Chief Justice Marshall introduced the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, he began with the observation that:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially so far as its operation is infta-territoria4 but is
carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective par87
ties to the instrument.'
And so the situation might have stood, had it not been for the U.S.
Constitution:
In the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
188
become a rule for the Court.
It is the Constitution that requires a different (and "unnatural") ordering of the relation between international and domestic law. But
the Constitution can only work its magic in certain situations: even if
a treaty is equated with legislation, it cannot really operate as legislation unless it looks like legislation. Unless a treaty looks like legislation, it reverts to its natural status of unenforceability in domestic
courts.

18 9

The black-box theory of international obligation also lies behind
several other elements of doctrinal provincialism: the rules that Congressional legislation supersedes prior treaty provisions and customary
law, and the rule that executive action supersedes prior customary
Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-314 (1829) (emphasis added).
Id. at 314.
189 Professor Paust reads Marshall's analysis differently, arguing that Marshall would
find all treaties capable of direct judicial enforcement unless the treaty itself explicitly contemplates further domestic legislation. Jordan J. Paust, Sef-Executing Treaties, 82 Am.J.
INT'L L. 760, 767-68 (1988). I find this reading difficult to square with Marshall's remarks
that a treaty is not "in its nature" a legislative act, and that it "does not generally effect, of
itself, the object to be accomplished." Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313 (emphasis added).
187
188

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

law.190 At first blush, the "last-in-time" principle' 9 1 justifies these
rules, but it is the black-box theory that ultimately sustains them.
Each rule acknowledges that the political branches properly limit a
court's ability to enforce international law. The black-box theory, in
turn, makes that limitation plausible. To see the connection, consider
an alternative view of international obligations: suppose such obligations apply not only to the state as a whole, but to each organ of the
state.' 9 2 On such a view, the President and the Congress would be
obliged to act within the confines of international law and, correspondingly, the courts would be under no obligation to give effect to
their acts contravening that law. On such an alternative view, the notion that presidential or congressional action can override treaty and
customary rules becomes much harder, if not impossible, tojustify. In
short, the black-box theory helps to explain how an American court of
law can knowingly violate "our law," or countenance violations of "our
law" by the President and Congress.
But domestic reliance on black-box theory is flawed for two reasons. First, the theory itself simply has begun to crumble under the
weight of contrary evidence. With increasing frequency since World
War II, international law has reached inside state boundaries to make
193
individuals the holders of rights and the bearers of responsibilities.
It has reached inside the state to require that legislatures act, that executives prosecute, and that courts try.' 94 It is no longer tenable to
190
191

See supra notes 31, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
192
Professor Paust argues persuasively that this alternative view was in fact the "original understanding," at least regarding treaties. Paust, supra note 189, at 760-66.
193 The growth of international human rights law bears witness to the proposition that
individuals increasingly hold rights under international law. See generallyANTONIO CASSESE,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD (1990) (discussing the rights of individuals and
peoples in the context of the international community); DAVID P. FORSYrHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS (1991) (analyzing and documenting the growth of international human rights); HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Thedor Meron ed., 1984)
(discussing global and regional protection of human rights); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1
(1982) (exploring various human rights protected by international law). At the same time,
individuals are increasingly understood to be the bearers of responsibility under international law. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY Doc. No. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., art. IUI-lV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (registered Jan. 12, 1951) (criminalizing genocide and related offenses); International L.
Comm'n, Draft Code of CrimesAgainst the Peaceand Security of Mankind, 30 IL.M. 1584, 15841593 (1991); see generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986)
(discussing all aspects of international criminal law including penalties for individual
breaches of international law).
194 This results especially from human rights and anti-terrorism conventions. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 193,
at 277, art. V-VI (directing ratifying states to undertake domestic legislation and to try
those charged with genocide); United Nations, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028 (1984) (obliging states to "take effective
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maintain that international law is "in its nature" a state-to-state affair,
or that it is fundamentally incapable of peering inside the black-box of
the state.' 95
Second, whatever its current state of decline, black-box theory
represents the internationalcommunity's position on the nature of international legal obligation, not necessarily the position properly taken
by individual states, including the United States. Black-box theory
makes a great deal of sense, from a global perspective, because it recognizes both the fact and legitimacy of states having organized themselves in different ways. It would be an unwarranted interference in
domestic affairs, as well as impractical, to require that specific institutions carry out international obligations. But when one moves from a
global view to -a domestic view, the analysis changes radically. The
United States has organized itself in a manner that suggests the domestic application of black-box theory is inappropriate. The United
States has exalted the rule of law and has made its courts the final
arbiters of that law. In such a context, one cannot treat it as a matter
of indifference (as might the international community) whether the
nation's political branches should be bound to act in accordance with
international law, or whether the courts should play a leading role as
that law's final arbiters. Black box theory is plausible internationally,
but far less so domestically.
2.

The Quasi-ConstitutionalSources

Taken together, legal positivism and the black-box theory of international legal obligation go a long way toward explaining the deepest foundations of doctrinal provincialism in U.S. courts. From the
courts' perspective, however, the more immediate concern is the Constitution and what it says about the proper relation between domestic
and international law.
Actually, the Constitution says very little. The only direct statement comes from Article VI:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures" to prevent torture); GA Res. 146,
United Nations, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm., 34th Sess., Agenda Item 113, at art. 2-6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979), reprinted

in 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1456-1459 (1979) (requiring states to legislate, investigate, and prosecute hostage-takers).
195 Professors Schwarzenberger and Brown aptly summarize the general situation:
"The rules governing recognition [of international personality] are so elastic that there is
no limit to the objects which, by recognition, may be transformed into subjects of international law." GEORG SC-VARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64
(6th ed. 1976).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:4

supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
196
to the Contrary notvithstanding.

This requires only that treaties override state law. It does not specify
how treaties fare against the Constitution and congressional statutes
or how other sources of international law relate to domestic law. The
courts, of course, have filled in the gaps and, in doing so, have often
perceived themselves as performing constitutional analysis. Such a
characterization may not be harmful, so long as one remembers that:
(i) whatever it is that the courts are analyzing, it is not the constitutional text;19 7 and (ii) theories of American government, founded not
on the explicit text of the Constitution, but on structure, history, and
policy, are subject to counter-arguments based on the same extrinsic
98

sources.1
What the courts have developed, in the face of textual silence, is a
quasi-constitutional theory of American government characterized by
the desire to maintain separate spheres of authority among the coordinate branches of the federal government. These "separation of
powers" concerns have generated principles of deference to the Congress and the President that have inhibited the courts' ability to apply
international law. Such deference clearly lies both behind the rules
that congressional action supersedes prior international treaties and
international customary law, and the suggestion that executive action
supersedes earlier custom. 199 In these circumstances, courts will enforce a violation of intemational law because another branch of government caused it. In addition, deference to the Congress and the
President lies behind the rule that U.S. courts will not apply treaties
and customary law unless they are self-executing. 20 0 In this situation,
courts defer because they believe themselves unable to apply interna20 1
tional law unless Congress enacts implementing legislation.
But what in the structure of American government requires judicial deference to the other branches? Two primary theories exist.

196

U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.

197 Cf. Henkin, supranote 31, at 1562-63 & n.31 (1984) (noting that the language of
the Constitution does not require certain judicial doctrines that disfavor international
law).
198 See, e.g., FRucI<, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8, at 31-60; Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 12-41 (1933); Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine., 85 YALE LJ. 597, 622 (1976).
199 See supranotes 31, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
200 See supranotes 30, 33 and accompanying text.
201
This sort of deference, of course, also derives from the black-box theory of international legal obligation. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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a. Locus of the Sovereign Will
Courts in the United States often defer to the political branches,
especially to Congress, on the ground that those other branches,
rather than the courts, represent the locus of American sovereignty.
While talk of "sovereignty" is often loose (and sometimes dangerous),
if one takes the word to mean "ultimate political authority," the argument seems straightforward enough. If the political authority of the
nation lies ultimately with its people, those branches of government
elected by the people- Congress and the President-speak with
more authority than the unelected branch.
One sees this principle at work, for example, in Whitney v. Robertson.202 In that case, the Supreme Court sought support for the rule

that later statutes supersede prior treaties as the law to be applied in
U.S. courts. In Whitney, Justice Field wrote that "the duty of the courts
is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign
will."2 0 3 He presumed that the legislature is the proper locus of "the
sovereign will" and that, when the sovereign changes its mind, the
204
courts are obliged to follow.

An even clearer and more detailed use of the principle appears in
the Head Money Cases.20 5 In that case Justice Miller considered the
possible justifications for the opposite rule, which would place treaties, categorically, above congressional legislation.
The Constitution gives [a treaty] no superiority over an act of Congress ....

Nor is there anything in its essential character, or in the

branches of the government by which the treaty is made, which gives it this
superiorsanctity.
A treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are
made by the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The addition of the latter body to the other two in making a
law certainly does not render it less entitled to respect in the matter
of its repeal or modification than a treaty made by the other two. If
there be any difference in this regard, it would seem to be in favor
of an act in which all three of the bodies participate. 20 6

In short, the source of law that engages the greatest number of our
elected institutions is the one most entitled to judicial deference.
124 U.S. 190 (1888).
1d.at 195.
204
See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that an
exercise of legislative power to keep Chinese laborers out of the United States superseded
any treaty between the United States and China); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A entury of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HAv. L. RFv. 853, 854
(1987) (concluding that the judiciary abdicates its responsibility in failing to prevent the
202

203

executive from breaching international obligations).
205
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
206 let at 599 (emphasis added).
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But judicial deference to Congress or the President, on the
ground that the elected branches of government more directly engage the people's-and thus the nation's-sovereign will, is unduly
simplistic and does not account for the ways in which we actually distribute legal authority. There is no simple correlation between the
method by which a decision-maker is selected and the legal authority
of that decision-maker. Many state judges, for example, are elected
directly by the citizens of the state in which they serve, but they do
not, for this reason, have the power to overturn the actions of appointed state officials. Collectively, state governments are just as
electorally well connected to the people as the federal government,
but this does not lead us to conclude that they may countermand earlier federal law.2 0 7 And most dramatically of all, the appointive status

of federal judges has not prevented us from accepting their assertion
of the power to overturn the work of popularly elected legislatures
and executives, both federal and state, on the ground that these asser20 8
tions of "the people's will" are unconstitutional.
Ties to the electorate are important, but often not decisive, in
settling questions of relative legal authority. Other principles-turning on concerns of constitutionalism and the proper roles of different
governmental actors-come into play. And once a court accepts (as it
must) the propriety of resorting to "non-electoral" principles in sorting out questions of authority, it cannot defer to the elected branches
simply because they are elected. The courts must dig deeper than
"sovereign will" analysis.
A return to the work of Justice Miller in the Head Money Cases2 09
reveals the fruitfulness of digging deeper. As he sought to determine
whether later congressional acts should supersede earlier treaty obligations as the law of the United States, Justice Miller's "sovereign will"
analysis led him to conclude that there was nothing "in the branches
of government by which the treaty is made, which gives it ... superior
sanctity." 2 10 Indeed, he found a slight reason for preferring congressional acts, since they involve the concurrence of the President, Senate, and House, while treaties only require consent by the President
and Senate. 21 ' Tellingly, however, Justice Miller did not rest his con207
Of course such a conclusion would contravene the Supremacy Clause. See e.g.,
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (discussing state court responsibility under
Supremacy Clause).
208 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Acceptance ofjudicial review

does not, of course, mean "acceptance without controversy." See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIUTNONAL LAW 23-66 (2d ed. 1988) (canvassingjudicial and scholarly reaction

to judicial review).
209 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
210 Id. at 599.
211
Id.
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clusion on "electoral analysis," but turned instead to another principle: the electoral authority of congressional acts and treaties being of
roughly equal soundness, he concluded that the principle of "last-intime" should govern.2 12 He himself recognized the limits of sovereign
will analysis and turned to another principle.
Once the relevance of other principles is recognized, there is no
good reason, a priori, to stop at "last-in-time." In the HeadMoney question, for example, Justice Miller might have noted that a preference
for later congressional acts, because it puts the United States in violation of prior international obligations, engages the nation's legal liability for reparations or damages, and that a preference for earlier
treaties does not. Based on a principle of "relative legal liability," Justice Miller could have sensibly concluded, and we might conclude today, that treaty law supersedes even later congressional acts.2 13 In any
event, we can surely agree with Justice Miller that courts ought not
defer to the President or Congress solely on the ground that they are
the proper repositories of the sovereign will.
b. Locus of Foreign Affairs Power
Sovereign will analysis often leads courts to defer to Congress.
Judicial deference to the President is, however, more likely based on
the President's perceived role in foreign affairs. The President's preeminence in foreign affairs derives its cogency from two different lines
of argument. The first is constitutional and is grounded in a particular reading of the Constitution that places "foreign affairs" in the President's hands.2 14 The second is practical and is drawn primarily from
reflections about the necessities of any government, however organized: courts defer to the President because nations need a single voice
in foreign affairs and the executive branch is the branch best organ2 15
ized to provide that single voice.
But as a ground for doctrinal provincialism, judicial deference to
the President in foreign affairs is dubious. First, the Constitution
212

Id

See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 204, at 870-71 (noting, among other things, that "treaties may indeed have superior sanctity.because of their essential character as international
obligations.").
214 E.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (ruling President exclusively
responsible for conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 696-97 (1862) (stating that President conducts foreign relations of
government).
215
E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that many questions of foreign
relations uniquely demand a single-voiced statement of the government's views); Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (arguing that it would be impossible for the
executive to conduct foreign relations if every court in the country had the authority to
decide whether the person who ratified a treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had such
power to ratify).
213
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makes no mention of a "foreign affairs power," much less places it
with the President. Instead, the Constitution gives specific "foreign
affairs" powers to each branch of government: to the President, it
grants the command of the armed forces and the power to appoint
and receive ambassadors; 21 6 to the Congress, it gives the power to declare war, regulate foreign trade, and set tariffs;2 17 and to the

Supreme Court, it grants the power to hear cases affecting Ambassadors and other foreign officials. 2 18 Since foreign affairs competence is
divided among all three branches, one should not conceive the President's control of foreign affairs as exclusive, even if one acknowledges
2 19
the President's primacy in those matters.
Second, even acknowledging the President's preeminent role in
foreign affairs, one may properly question the extent to which that
role should influence U.S. judicial treatment of international law.
There is nothing inconsistent in thinking that foreign affairs policy
belongs in the executive branch and international law in the judicial
branch. 220 Though clearly related, foreign affairs policy and international law are distinct areas of endeavor, just as domestic policy and
domestic law are legitimately subject to division between the political
branches and the courts.
Likewise, deference to the President on the "one-voice" theorythe notion, that is, that the nation needs to speak with one voice, that
of the President-would be more convincing but for two facts: (1) it
is not clear that nations need to speak with one voice in order to survive, or even to prosper, in international relations; 2 21 and (2) because
of congressional prerogatives, our nation often speaks with at least two
222
voices anyway.
3.

The InternationalSources

Two elements of doctrinal provincialism appear to find their justification not in jurisprudential theories of law or quasi-constitutional
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2, § S.
217 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 11.
218 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The federal courts as a whole are given even wider responsibilities in international affairs. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power to all cases
involving treaties, admiralty and maritime claims, and suits between U.S. and foreign
citizens).
219 SeeArthur Bestor, SeparationofPowers in the Domain ofForeignAffairs: The Intent of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HAu. L. REv. 527, 537-40 (1974) (arguing founders did not intend foreign policy to be the prerogative of any one branch).
220 See, e.g., FR.ANCK, PoLrrICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8, at 5-6 (distinguishing foreign
policy from judicial policy); HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at 205-24 (describing
legitimate role of courts in matters involving international relations).
221 On the experience of post-war Germany, for example, see FRaNcK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8, at 107-25.
216

222
See, e.g., TnoMAs M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13
(1979); HENMN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supranote 15, at 89-123; TRIBE, supra note 208, at 219-25.
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theories of American government, but, ironically, in the theory and
practice of international law itself. More specifically, the reluctance of
U.S. courts to find the existence of an international custom, or to find
the existence of a general principle of law, echoes a similar reluctance
in the practice of international courts.
International custom is hard to establish. It requires a consistent
pattern of behavior by nation-states and a belief by those states that
such behavior is legally required.223 The classic case of the S.S. Lotus, 224 decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice in

1927, demonstrates how difficult it can be to convince even an international court that a custom exists. In Lotus, the French government
objected to the Turkish trial of a French seaman following a collision
of French and Turkish vessels on the high seas.2 25 The French sought
to establish rules of customary law that would bar such a trial, but
failed, in three successive attempts to convince the Court that the proposed rules did in fact exist.226 On a more abstract level, before and

after Lotus, the very nature of international custom, and the theory by
227
which it binds states, have been matters of controversy.
General principles of law, likewise, are sometimes difficult to establish. Even the International Court of Justice, whose founding statute explicitly makes general principles of law a primary source of
international law,228 has been "distinctly, and perhaps understanda-

bly, conservative" 229 in its use of such principles. It is fairly common
for scholars and judges to relegate general principles of law to "filling
23 0
in the gaps" left by treaty and custom.

223 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 102 (2) cmts. b, c (stating custom results from a
general and consistent practice of states, acting out of a sense of legal obligation);
ANTHoNYA D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 47-72 (1971) (summarizing traditional views on the elements of custom); KAROL WOLV, , CUSTOM IN PRESENT

INTERNATIONAL .AW 40-51 (2d rev. ed. 1993) (summarizing elements of custom from the

practice of the International Court ofJustice and the International Law Commission).
224 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Sept. 7).
225 1&at 5-6.
226 Id. at 22-31.
227 See, e.g., D'AMATO, supranote 223, at 47-102, 169-229 (presenting scholarly and judicial arguments about the elements of custom and its binding force); WoLux, supra note
223, at 1-44, 160-68 (same).
228 ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1)(c).
229 C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 305 (1964); see

also Schrader, supra note 36, at 769 (describing international courts as conservative in their
application of general principles).
230 E.g., Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972
I.C.J. 46, 109 (Aug. 18) (separate opinion ofJudge Dillard) (stating general principles act
as aids in establishing custom or the implied terms of treaties); RESTATEMENT, supra note
14, § 102(4) (describing general principles as "supplementary rules" that may be important when no custom or treaty applies);JJANIs, supra note 32, at 54-58 (describing general
principles as "gap fillers").
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U.S. courts-in their reluctance to find the existence of custom
and general principles of law-seem merely to have adopted a practice of caution shared by their international counterparts. But this
appearance is misleading. Although cautionary in their approach, international tribunals habitually invoke custom and general principles
of law in their judgments. 231 This is hardly surprising, since custom
continues to dominate many areas of international law,232 and since

international law still has many "gaps" left to be filled by general
233
principles.
Seen in this light, U.S. courts have pushed caution to an extreme. 234 For example, the Supreme Court has not explicitly recog-

nized the existence of a custom in almost 100 years. 23 5 Lower federal
courts have made such holdings on occasion, 236 but a handful of cases
in a century's worth of litigation bespeaks a level of caution better
described as full retreat.237 General principles of law have fared no
better. 23 8 Despite their caution, international tribunals regularly find
231

See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS

AND TRIBUNALS 387-99 (1953) (formulating a draft code of international principles that
international courts and tribunals apply);JENKS, supranote 229, at 266-315 (reviewing general principles that international tribunals utilize); H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAw SOURCES
AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-62 (1927)

(noting that agreements between gov-

ernments direct international courts and tribunals, in almost all cases, to apply general

principles of some sort); WoLFE, supra note 223, at 116-59 (reviewing international judicial practice in ascertaining custom); Rudolph Bernhardt, Customary InternationalLaw, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (1984) (presenting a short survey of the
theory and application of customary law); Hermann Mosler, GeneralPrinciplesof Law, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 89 (1984) (describing general principles that
judicial tribunals invoke).
232 See WOLFKE, supra note 223, at xiii.
233

See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49 (1991).

234 Cf Schrader, supra note 36, at 757 (observing that U.S. courts "have traditionally
been more conservative than international bodies in deriving rules of law from such
sources as custom and general principles").
235 Research for this Article indicates that the last such case was The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677 (1900).
236 E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that statesponsored torture violates international customary law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.
Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that "causing disappearances" is an international
tort established by custom); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980)
(holding that indeterminate detention of an alien implicates customary law), affd on other
grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
237 See Trimble, Revisionist View, supra note 8, at 684-707 (documenting the infrequent
use of customary law in American courts). Courts in the United States have often made
reference to customary law, assuming it exists for the purpose of argument or using it to
help construe congressional legislation. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1135-62
(1990) (collecting cases and describing historical development of international law's use as
interpretive aid). But these uses differ categorically from an explicit determination that a
rule of customary law does exist, and a determination of its precise content.
238 See Schrader, supranote 36, at 769-79 (discussing recent judicial references to "general" or "universally accepted" principles). None of the opinions the Schrader Note de-
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and apply both custom and general principles; the virtual refusal of
American courts to find such law at all cannot reasonably be justified
2 39
as merely echoing the international approach.
4.

The Prognosisfor Change

Doctrinal provincialism is not so easily condemned as its methodological sibling. Although its potential harms are greater-to litigants, to the courts, to the United States, and to international law-it
is founded on grounds more laudable than ignorance. This is not to
say, however, that they are good grounds, or good enough to justify
the harms.
Opinions are likely to vary on the current vigor of positivism and
the black-box theory of international legal obligation, but support for
these theories is clearly declining. As these theories erode, the philosophical bases of doctrinal provincialism erode with them. Opinions
will also vary on the strength of the quasi-constitutional theories of
American government that push U.S. courts to eschew the application
of international law in deference to the work of the political branches.
But these theories, too, are debatable and the constitutional text
clearly does not require them. All of this suggests that doctrinal provincialism, while not to be condemned categorically, ought to be subjected to a searching, element-by-element review.
Change will be difficult. Each element of doctrinal provincialism
is grounded not only in the deeper philosophical and constitutional
considerations discussed here, but more immediately in precedent.
Some elements are more firmly entrenched in precedent than others,
but all have judicial decisions, sometimes Supreme Court decisions,
supporting them.2 40 Change will necessarily require a firm conviction
that the old ways were wrong or, at least, that they warrant serious
reexamination. The strength of recent criticism suggests that some
elements of doctrinal provincialism ought to be jettisoned and others
2 41
modified.
scribes explicitly derived a rule of international, as opposed to domestic, law from a
general principle of law.
239 But c.f Schrader, supranote 36, at 762-68, 770-82 (reviewing and criticizing recent
uses of customary law and general principles of law in American decisions); Trimble, Revisionist Tiew, supranote 8, at 678-84, 707-31 (questioning the legitimacy and wisdom of domestic judicial use of customary international law). Those who doubt the legitimacy or
wisdom of invoking custom and general principles in U.S. courts are understandably less
concerned about judicial failures to find the existence of such rules in the first place.
240

See supra notes 30-36.

241

On the self-executing treaties doctrine, see, for example, Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine

of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A CriticalAnalysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986);
Faust, supra note 189. On the last-in-time doctrine, see, for example, Henkin, ChineseExclusion, supra note 204, at 870-78 (1987); Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Be-
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C. Jurisdictional Provincialism
Jurisdictional provincialism-the tendency of U.S. courts to exclude international cases from the domestic docket-is the most challenging of provincialism's three forms to assess. As we have already
seen, its harms-to litigants, to the United States, and to international
law-are more contingent than those of provincialism's other forms,
because not every international case excluded from the American
docket necessarily involves international law. Those things that make
a case "international"-the existence, for example, of parties, evidence, or events with different national links-increase the likelihood, but do not assure, that international law is germane. And if it is
not, then ajudicial refusal to hear such a case causes no harm to international law or the interests of the international community.
Many international cases, however, do involve international law.
The refusal to hear such cases risks injustice to litigants with claims
well-founded in that law, risks harm to the United States if the courts'
refusal to hear such cases permits on-going U.S. violations of international law, and harms international law, which goes unvindicated.
Whether international law is involved or not, a denial of a hearing
always risks injustice (if, for example, no other forum is available) and
always causes a delay in justice. Such harms should not be countenanced unless otherwise justified.
What, then, are the grounds of'jurisdictional provincialism? Unlike doctrinal and methodological provincialism, jurisdictional provincialism grows out of neither ignorance nor a concern for the proper
role of international law. Rather, it grows out of a concem for the
proper role of the courts themselves. It grows from the conviction
that courts ought not to hear every case presented to them for
decision.
Generally speaking, courts reject cases for three sorts of reasons.
First, a case must be well-suited to judicial resolution. If there are no
opposing parties with real interests currently at stake, or if the parties
seek or need a kind of relief that courts cannot easily provide, judicial
resolution is inappropriate. Such considerations have generated the
24 3
requirement of standing, 242 as well as the doctrines of mootness

tween CongressionalPower and InternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the
Primacy of Custom, 28 VA.J. INT'L L. 393 (1988).
242 E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,

731-32 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
243 E.g., SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972); Hall v.
Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495-97
(1969).
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and ripeness, 244 and the judicial aversion to advisory opinions. 24 5 Second, assuming a case is well-suited to judicial resolution, a court may
refrain from deciding on grounds of fairness, believing, for example,
that a particular proceeding burdens the litigants with a process they
had no legitimate reason to expect, or with one held in a place that is
needlessly inconvenient. These considerations have generated rules
of personal jurisdiction 246 and the defense of forum non conveniens. 24 7 Third, even if a cause is susceptible to judicial resolution
and the particular proceedings are likely to be fair to the parties, a
court may still refrain from deciding because it believes that some
other court, or some other institution entirely, is more appropriate.
This deference to other decision-makers lies behind most of the elements of jurisdictional provincialism and warrants further analysis.
Sometimes a court defers to other courts within its own national
system by refusing to hear a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 2 48 or staying a case currently pending in another court under the
lis alibi pendens doctrine. 249 Sometimes a court defers instead to the
other branches of government by refusing to hear a case that raises a
"political question."5 0 And sometimes a court defers to authorities in
other nations by providing immunity to a foreign sovereign 25 ' or by
244 E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1983); Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
245
E.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.(a) (1792).
246 E.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (statingjurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of-forum defendant turns on traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice); see also Helicopteros Nacionaes de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) (determining foreign corporation's contacts with the State of Texas insufficient to
support in personam jurisdiction); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (ruling that minimum contacts with the forum state are needed in order to
subject a defendant to an in personam judgment).
247 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (ruling dismissal appropriate when plaintiff's chosen forum is oppressive or vexatious to defendant and an alternative forum exists); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947)
(discussing the interests a court should take into account when deciding whether to dismiss based upon a claim of forum non conveniens).
248 E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Xroger, 437 U.S. 365,377 (1978) (determining
that wrongful death claim between two Iowa litigants is a matter for adjudication in state
forum).
249 E.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 184 (1952) (upholding stay of federal action in Delaware so that federal action in Illinois could proceed);
Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 253 (1936) (setting out principles for determining
propriety of staying action in one court in deference to actions in another); see generally
Propriety of Staying Action or Proceeding Pending Another Action or Proceeding, 81 L.
Ed. 161 annot. (1937) (discussing scope of lis alibi pendens doctrine).
250 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-17 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1, 46 (1849).
251
E.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576 (1926); United States v.
Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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refusing to sit in judgment of a foreign nation's acts within its own
territory (the "act of state doctrine").252
This analysis suggests a straightforward correspondence between
the sorts of institutions deferred to-other domestic courts, other
branches of domestic government, and other nations-and the particular elements ofjurisdictional provincialism. The situation, however,
is more complex than that. It often happens that a particular form of
judicial self-abnegation is grounded on deference to more than one
decision-maker. The act of state doctrine, for example, is grounded
both on deference to foreign states and deference to the executive
branch of our domestic government (the courts believing thatjudicial
review of another nation's actions may interfere with the foreign relations prerogatives of the President).253 The lis alibi pendens doctrine,
to cite another example, usually involves deference to another court,
but if that court is in another country, deference to a foreign sover2 54
eign and its judicial process is also implicated.
In sum, jurisdictional provincialism grows out of at least three
overlapping concerns: that the parties' dispute be amenable to judicial resolution; that the parties be treated fairly; and that no other
decision-maker is better situated to handle the matter. 255 The first
two concerns are less problematic than the third. It is undoubtedly
true that some disputes are not well-suited to judicial resolution. A
request for judgment, for example, that does not involve a conflict
between real adversaries, with real interests at stake, is likely to be handled poorly by a court system whose rules and practices presume the
existence of such adversaries at every turn. Similarly, it is hard to
question, in principle, a court's concern with whether a particular
252
E.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 402-04
(1990); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1964); Underhill v.

Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
253

Compare Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (discussing sovereignty of states rationale) with

Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 423, 426 (offering constitutional separation-of-powers
rationale).
254 E.g., Robinson v. Royal Bank of Can., 462 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(per curiam).
255
The immediate doctrinal sources of deference vary as well. Courts defer to others
based on the requirements of the Constitution, on congressional statutes, and on prior
judicial decisions. Judge-made rules of deference, in turn, are usually based on prudence.
Grounds for a particular doctrine can also vary over time. Foreign sovereign immunity, for
example, was historically based on the perceived requirements of international law and a
quasi-constitutional, separation-of-powers deference to the President in matters of foreign
affairs; today, a congressional statute clearly forms the basis for such immunity. Compare
National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (reviewing the international and national policies underlying the judge-made doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity) withForeign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988) andH.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604, 6610-11
(FSIA to provide "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts.").
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proceeding would be unfair to one of the parties. Courts are particularly concerned with fairness and one would expect them to abstain
from acting in ways that are unfair. But if a case is amenable to judicial resolution and the particular proceeding would be fair to the parties involved, it becomes harder tojustify abstention. If a court can do
a good job and do it fairly, then it properly defers to other institutions
only when that deference is clearly warranted.
Courts in the United States do, of course, work within a system of
governments, both domestic and foreign, and a sensitivity to "system"
concerns is certainly appropriate. But U.S. courts tend to go astray in
just this area, by overestimating the claims of other institutions as better fora. This propensity is clearest in their deference to the political
branches and to the governments of other nations.2 56 Judicial deference to the political branches, as demonstrated earlier, derives primarily from quasi-constitutional theories of American government not
required by the constitutional text.2 57 Likewise, judicial deference to

other nations is frequently overblown. Our courts uncritically defer to
the "prerogatives of foreign sovereigns" in cases in which international law recognizes no such prerogatives or recognizes them in a
much more limited fashion than do our courts. 258 This suggests that
the elements ofjurisdictional provincialism most in need of serious reexamination are those that are founded primarily on deference to the
domestic political branches and to other nations, specifically, the
political question doctrine, foreign sovereign immunity, and the act of
state doctrine. Indeed, these particular elements ofjurisdictional pro-

256
See FRANcK, PoLrrcA. QUESTIONS, supra note 8, passim (presenting an extended,
well-reasoned attack on judicial deference to the political branches). In Franck's view, such
deference animates not only the political question doctrine, but the act of state doctrine
and the judicially-created rules of foreign sovereign immunity.
257 See supra part IV.B.2.
258 The act of state doctrine, for example, finds little support in international law.

International scholar Ian Brownlie says flatly that it "is not a rule of public international
law." BROWNLUE, supranote 14, at 507. The United States Supreme Court has itself recognized that international law does not compel recognition of the doctrine. Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1964). The Restatement quite properly describes it as "Law of the United States." RESTATEmENT, supra note 14, § 443.
The Restatement describes the provision of foreign sovereign immunity, on the other
hand, as "an undisputed principle of customary international law." Id. at 390. Even so,
domestic courts have historically provided immunity to foreign sovereigns under circumstances that international law did not require: first, by maintaining a rule of "absolute"
immunity at a time when other states had begun to provide such immunity only on a more
restricted basis; and second, by deferring conclusively to executive branch determinations
of immunity when international law nowhere required such a practice. See Ex Pane Rep.
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571 (1926).
Congress forced change with the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a) (2) (3) (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988).
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vincialism have tended to attract the most scathing criticism by inter259
national scholars.

The other elements of jurisdictional provincialism-personal jurisdiction requirements, subject-matter jurisdiction requirements,
standing requirements, the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the
lis alibi pendens doctrine-require scrutiny as well, although their ultimate reform will be harder to achieve. As previously noted, they
tend to derive from legitimate concerns about the limits of the judicial
function and the need for fairness. 2 60 In addition, they have developed primarily in a domestic context and have "proven" themselves in
a broad range of (admittedly domestic) cases. It is unlikely, for this
reason, that courts will simply discard them. Consequently, the proponent of change must take the rhetorically difficult position of arguing that an exception should be made, and that the effects of a
jurisdictional rule should be ameliorated, when international cases
arise. Moreover, rhetorical disadvantage aside, many of the remaining
elements ofjurisdictional provincialism are based on constitutional or
statutory provisions, which, at least from ajudge's perspective, places
them beyond effective criticism. 26'
Despite these hurdles, the remaining elements of jurisdictional
provincialism ought to be examined and reformed. First, problems
often arise from the application of a doctrine rather than from the
doctrine itself or its underlying rationale. For example, the use of the
standing requirement most corrosive to international law derives not
so much from the requirement itself,but from its use as a vehicle for
259
On the political question doctrine, see, for example, Michael J. Glennon, Foreign
Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 814 (1989); Louis Henkin, Lexical
Priorityor "PoliticalQuestion": A Response, 101 HARv. L.Rxv. 524 (1987); Henkin, supra note
15; Wayne McCormack, TheJusticiabilityMyth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 595 (1987). On the act of state doctrine, see, for example, MichaelJ. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. Rv.325 (1986). Since the passage of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, scholarly attention has generally been drawn away from
the essential soundness of providing foreign sovereign immunity and defining its proper
limits, and has instead focused on the Act's application in the courts. The primary purpose
of this focus has been to bring order out of chaos. See, e.g., Mark B. Feldman, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts: 1976-1986, 19 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1986);
see generallyFRANca, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8,passim (criticizingjudicial use of all
three doctrines).
260
See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
261
In federal practice, for example, only the forum non conveniens and lis alibi
pendens doctrines lack some direct foundation in the Constitution, congressional statute,

or federal rule. SeeBoiN & W=SrN, supranote 17, at 275, 320. The purely domestic use of

forum non conveniens now has a statutory foundation. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Both
the Constitution, U.S. CONs-. art. III, § 2, and federal statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332
(1988) directly address subject matter jurisdiction. Federal rule, FED. R Civ. P. 4(k), and
constitutional requirements of due process, U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, govern personal
jurisdiction. Although neither the Constitution, statute, nor rule explicitly require standing, it is grounded in the constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
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applying the "black-box" theory of international legal obligation: 262
its use in denying standing to individuals with international law claims
because those individuals "are not the subjects of international
law."263 A change in this particular application of standing doctrine
does not threaten either the requirement itself or the legitimate policy that underlies it. Likewise, personal jurisdiction requirements and
the forum non conveniens doctrine can be profitably analyzed to insure that their application to international cases does not rely on simi2 64
larly misguided notions of legal theory or international law.

Second, although most of these doctrines have "proven" themselves in a broad range of domestic cases, and any change to them
would likely come in the form of exceptions, such exceptions might
be justified for international cases. Simply put, the stakes are higher
when a court declines to hear an international case. When a court
declines to hear a domestic case, there is some assurance that another
domestic forum will be available. Domesticjurisdictional rules tend to
be developed with an eye toward the rules of other domestic jurisdictions, and as a consequence, relatively few domestic cases "fall between the cracks." 2 65 In international cases, however, the alternative
fora are more likely to be located in foreign states with which our own
domestic jurisdictional rules are not coordinated. Consequently, for
the international case, a denial ofjurisdiction in a U.S. court is more
likely to result in a denial of a hearing anywhere.2 66 If an alternative
forum is found, the change of forum is likely to be more convulsive
than in a domestic case, involving greatly increased travelling distances for at least one of the parties, a new language of adjudication,
and a very different set of procedures. Finally, because international
cases are more likely to involve international law, refusals to hear such
cases risk both harm to the United States, which may incur interna262
263

See supra notes 14 & 22 and accompanying text.
See supranote 22 (cases denying standing).
264
Courts can, at least, apply these doctrines with a view toward the special circumstances of international litigation. Since the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts now
essentially encompasses all that is constitutionally permissible, see FED. IL Civ. P.
4(k) (1) (A), (2), international rules ofjurisdiction to adjudicate can inform the due process analysis in international cases. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 421 (definingjurisdiction to adjudicate under international law). Forum non conveniens practice already
helps to minimize the danger that a U.S. court's refusal to hear a case will result in the case
not being heard at all by requiring that an alternative forum does, in fact, exist. See Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (stating dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds generally inappropriate if alternative forum provides "clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory" remedy); see generally BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 17, at 312-16 (containing a
careful discussion and survey of cases on the alternative forum requirement).
265
The knowledge that one or more state courts will serve as alternative fora might,
for example, assuage worries about strict jurisdictional rules in the federal courts.
266 The forum non conveniens doctrine is the only element of jurisdictional provincialism that takes explicit account of the availability of an alternative forum. See supra note
264.
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tional liability for a continued violation of that law, and harm to inter26 7
national law itself, which loses an opportunity for vindication.
There are no such risks when a U.S. court dismisses a purely domestic
case. These higher stakes, taken together, suggest that exceptions to
domestic jurisdictional rules are desirable in international cases.
Third, although many of these doctrines derive variously from
the Constitution, a statute, or a rule, and thus are immune from frontal judicial attack, only subject matter jurisdiction (at least in the federal system) has a direct basis in both the U.S. Constitution and in
congressional statutes. 268 Two other requirements-standing and
personal jurisdiction-have only an indirect basis in the Constitution,269 and the other doctrines have no constitutional or statutory
basis at all. In short, from ajudge's perspective, not all the elements
of jurisdictional provincialism are equally intransigent.
Finally, from a reformer's perspective, all the elements ofjurisdictional provincialism require careful examination. One cannot study
the domestic treatment of international law for very long without getting the clear impression that courts often use jurisdictional arguments as pretexts, or at least adopt them uncritically, to avoid having
to deal with international law.2 70 For the reformer, advances made in

eradicating methodological and doctrinal provincialism will be lost if
courts still find easy refuge in jurisdictional refusals to hear international cases at all.
V
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

American courts are more deeply and pervasively hostile to international law than is commonly acknowledged. The late William
Bishop's report to a generation of law students, that "American courts
frequently apply rules of international law,"'271 seems unnecessarily
bright.27 2 The evidence, in fact, runs the other way. The Supreme

Court's recent work-in Alvarez-Machain, Aramco, Hartford, and Saleillustrates the real status of international law in domestic decision267

See supra part III.B.1.
U.S. CONST. art. I1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
Id. art. III, § 2, amend. V,XIV (delineating the case or controversy requirement
from which developed the doctrine of standing and the due process clauses, which limit
the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
270 E.g., Bazyler, supra note 8, at 328 ("Courts use the [act of state] doctrine as an
excuse to avoid deciding difficult international transaction cases.").
271
WiLLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAw 78 (3d ed. 1971); see also Brilmayer,
supra note 8, at 2285 ("American courts routinely enforce international claims of varying
shapes and sizes.").
272 Compare the more measured and more recent claim of Professors Carter and
Trimble, that "[s]ometimes U.S. courts will apply international law." BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP K TriMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2d prtg. 1991).
268
269
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making 273 and that status is clearly marginal. What, then, should be
done?
The first step is to recognize the depth and breadth of the phenomenon. Professor Oscar Schachter has aptly described provincialism as "our guild's dirty little secret, which we tend to cover up with
the best of intentions." 27 4 However, a problem cannot be addressed
unless its existence is acknowledged. Those with the greatest interest
in promoting international law have the greatest interest in exposing
the full measure of its crippled domestic status.
The next step is to learn all we can about the phenomenon. As I
have argued throughout this Article, judicial animosity toward international law does not manifest itself as a large, undifferentiated mass
of rules and practices, but occurs in at least three distinct forms, each
with its own characteristic set ofjustifications and harms. I have also
tried to show the benefits of thinking about provincialism in this way.
What is most remarkable, I think, about these different forms is the
inverse symmetry between their wisdom and their amenability to
change. Methodological provincialism-the tendency to treat international cases as if they were domestic ones-is categorically bad and
the most amenable to change. Doctrinal provincialism-the tendency
to eschew international rules as rules of decision-although not categorically bad, is subject to element-by-element critique, and is less
amenable to change. Jurisdictional provincialism-the tendency to
dismiss cases with international implications-is least problematic categorically, and will be the most difficult to reform.
There is much work yet to be done. The constituent elements of
provincialism, the work-a-day rules and practices that present themselves to judges and lawyers, need serious, individual study. Some elements have already received such study. 275 Others need such study for
2 76
the first time.
The next step, which need not await the completion of a dozen
more studies, is to educate judges about international law. The most
enduring improvement would begin in law schools, with a required
course in international law. With such a requirement, the entire
bench (as well as those who appear before it) would eventually have a
273

See supra part II.
Letter from Oscar Schachter, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law & Diplomacy Emeritus, Columbia University School of Law, to Patrick M. McFadden, Associate
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (June 17, 1994) (on file with
author).
275
See, e.g., supra notes 8, 241, 259 (citing such studies).
276 The ways and means of methodological provincialism have never received systematic study. Elements of the other forms of provincialism that seem most in need of a fresh,
systematic examination are the lis alibi pendens doctrine and the judicial reluctance to
find the existence of general principles of law. Cf Trimble, Revisionist View, supranote 8, at
732 (reporting on the reluctance of courts to find custom).
274
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minimal facility in international legal argument and a minimal sensitivity to its possible applications. 2 77 A universally required course in
international law would, of course, represent a sea-change in the standard law school curriculum,

edented nor beyond
American law schools
European law schools
for their first degree.

2 78

but this requirement is neither unprec-

rational hope of achievement. A few North
(in Quebec and Puerto Rico) 27 9 and almost all
currently require a course in international law
Indeed, at the beginning of this century, about

one-quarter of U.S. law schools required it as well.28 0 Those days

might return: the Section of International Law and Practice of the
American Bar Association has recently recommended (this time unsuccessfully) that the multistate or individual state bar examinations
include international law questions.2 8 ' If such an effort ever succeeds,
curricular changes probably will follow.
Due regard for the real world, however, suggests that reformers
explore other avenues as well. Bar associations and others could offer
continuing legal education in international law to both lawyers and
judges, although an effort aimed at judges would be the most direct.2 82 The American Society of International Law and the ABA's

Section on International Law and Practice are natural choices to lead
such an effort, as is the National Judicial College for the education of
statejudges. 28 3 The federal judicial system and almost every state judicial system hold conferences at least annually. These conferences
could provide a forum for short-courses on international law and its
proper use in U.S. courts.
The success of programmatic efforts in continuing judicial education depends primarily on two things: first, on an institutionallybased, organized effort to bring the program to the attention ofjudicial educators, and second, on the ready availability of teaching mater277 For both theoretical and practical reasons, Professor Phillip R. Trimble has urged
those in charge of developing law school curricula to take better account of international
law not by requiring a separate course on the subject, but by integrating relevant aspects of
international law into current course offerings. Phillip R. Trimble, Affirmative Reply, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 408-09 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
278 No U.S. law school currently requires a course in international law. JOHN . GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990s 22 (1993).
279
280

Id

Id. at 4 (citing

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT ON THE

TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

26 (1913)).
281
Recommendation & Report, supra note 5, at 1.
282
The American Bar Association's Section on International Law and Practice has
long recognized the need for judicial education in international law. See Committee Report, supra note 10, at 903-04.
283
See generallyNational Conference of State Trial Judges & National Judicial College,
The Judge's Book 371-77 (2d ed. 1994) (surveying providers of continuing judicial
education).
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ials. Reformers should thus devote physical space, personnel and
funding to the effort and develop a model curriculum complete with
teaching materials. It would represent no small advance in these educational efforts simply to provide a primary text on international law
to every federal judge and to every state judge of general or appellate
jurisdiction.
The provision of books aside, the substance of the educational
effort would come in two parts. The first part would involve a study of
international law's sources, materials, and modes of argument, along
with some of its basic substantive principles. It would, in other words,
cover the kinds of topics typically surveyed in a law school course on
international law-geared, of course, toward those who are already
quite sophisticated in legal analysis. This would have an obvious and
direct effect on methodological provincialism. Armed with such
knowledge, judges simply could not ignore the differences between
international and domestic law.
The second part of the educational effort would involve a close
study of the relation between international and domestic law. It would
entail a longer and more sophisticated treatment of that subject than
is probably typical of most law school courses. The reason for this
emphasis is straightforward: judges must face the question of relevance every time international law is argued, or whenever they believe,
based on their own research, that it might be pertinent. This part of
the educational program would likely begin with a brief treatment of
the philosophical and constitutional framework within which international law operates domestically, followed by a critical examination of
the doctrines and practices discussed in this Article. It would examine
provincialism, element by element, asking in each case whether a constitutional or congressional mandate requires the doctrine or practice,
and if not, whether the policies supporting the doctrine or practice
are sufficiently persuasive to overcome its harms. Such an examination would necessarily include the question of whether courts should
read supporting judicial precedents narrowly, confine those precedents to their facts, or flatly overturn them as no longer good law.
The provincialism of U.S. courts does harm, sometimes serious
harm, to litigants, to the courts themselves, to the United States, to
international law, and to the rule of law. Such provincialism must be
challenged and U.S. judges must lead the effort. Judges are primarily
responsible for the treatment of international law in U.S. courts, and
judges are in the best position to implement reforms.

